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[T]he social world is also will and representation, and to exist socially means also to 
be perceived, and perceived as distinct. 
—Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 
 
Minorities are the major site for displacing the anxieties of many states about their 
own minority or marginality (real or imagined) in a world of a few megastates, of 
unruly economic flows and compromised sovereignties.  Minorities, in a word, are 
metaphors and reminders of the betrayal of the classical nationalist project. 
—Arjun Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“They treated me like a monster.  But I’m not a monster!”  These are the 
words of Cennet, a fifteen-year-old girl of Turkish origin and a high school student in 
Strasbourg.  Cennet, who had been wearing the headscarf to school for several years, 
had shown up at school with her hair tucked up into a cap in September 2004.  Earlier 
that year, France had banned the wearing of religious symbols—including 
headscarves—in French public schools.  After she had refused to remove her cap, 
Cennet was taken to the principal’s office and then put in a windowless room for the 
remainder of the day.  The next day, Cennet took drastic action in response to this 
treatment.  “I sat down.  I did whatever with my hair.  I cut it.  I shaved it all off with 
a Gillette high precision razor” (Le Monde October 2, 2004).   
Some teachers also had drastic reactions to this ban on religious symbols.  
One teacher, a self-proclaimed atheist of North African origin, resigned her post over 
the law, citing her opposition to “this coercive aspect consisting of wanting to liberate 
people despite themselves.  What kind of society are we creating?” (ibid.). 
By examining this incident we can discover several intriguing things about the 
issue of headscarves in France.  First of all, this all occurred in Strasbourg, which is 
also the home of the European Parliament.  How can such disparate things be 
occurring in the same place?  Second of all, Cennet’s decision to shave her head has 
some interesting connotations itself.  This rather extreme act was done to protest her 
treatment at school and the law banning headscarves itself.  Hair is also seen as a 
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sexualized attribute of women, and many believe that it must be covered in order to 
follow proper Muslim comportment (see Mahmood 2005).  Cennet herself points out 
that her act of head-covering was singled out, as other students in the same school 
commonly wore hats and bandanas without repercussions (Le Monde October 2, 
2004).  Finally, the teacher’s comment about the law’s coercive aspect points to the 
past entanglement of unveiling and colonial feminism in North Africa.1 As we will 
see, this problematic relation of the French state, feminism, and the veil continued in 
the headscarf affairs of 1989, 1994 and 2003.   
In this investigation I will determine some of the reasons that headscarves are 
such an ever-present and overriding concern in France.  The prolific debate and 
discussion about headscarves also serves to direct our attention to other aspects of 
French society at the times of the headscarf affairs, including the challenges of 
managing its minorities, reconsolidating and reasserting French national identity, and 
globalization.     
1989 Headscarf Affair 
In many ways, the Rushdie Affair served as an important prelude to the 1989 
headscarf affair.  In February of that year, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa 
(religious opinion) against Rushdie, declaring him to be an apostate who deserved 
death and his novel, The Satanic Verses, to be blasphemous.  This incident 
consolidated fears of Islam’s intolerance, vengefulness, and increasing worldwide 
success (Bowen 2007:83).   
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Although girls had been going to schools with headscarves on for years 
without any problems, the environment had changed in September 1989 when three 
girls—Samira Saidani, of Tunisian parents, and Leila and Fatima Achaboun of 
Moroccan parents—came to their middle school in Creil in Islamic dress.  For 
months, images of women in Islamic dress, mostly Iranian women in black chadors, 
were circulated throughout the media, often in association with the growing threat of 
political Islam (Bowen 2007:83; L’Express 30 April 2003).  Although the headscarf, 
or hijab, which these three girls were wearing to school, is significantly different in 
both appearance and meaning from the chador, this confusion of images and labels is 
seen in the fact that any sort of Islamic head-covering is commonly referred to in 
France as a chador (see Altschull 1995, for example).   
 When Ernest Chénière, the principal of their school, asked the girls to remove 
their headscarves, they refused.  Consequently the girls were expelled out of a 
concern to preserve the principle of laïcité (Sud Ouest 1 February 2004).  While I 
examine this concept in greater depth in Chapter 2, for the moment we can consider 
laïcité to be the religious neutrality of public spaces.  After many rounds of 
negotiations between the school administration, local associations and the girls’ 
parents, Samira, Leila and Fatima agreed to remove their scarves during class and 
were readmitted to school.  However, they began to wear their scarves again at the 
beginning of October.  They were expelled for a second time, and new negotiations 
began.  These negotiations now included national Muslim organizations, and this 
“headscarf affair” became a national incident (Bowen 2007:84).  Eventually King 
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Hassan II of Morocco asked the two girls of Moroccan origin to remove their scarves; 
they did and were readmitted to school (Sud Ouest 1 February 2004). Tunisia refused 
to intervene on the issue, and Samira was never readmitted (Bowen 2007:86).   
The media immediately jumped on the issue, playing on the perceived 
connections between headscarves and the wider threats posed by Islamic 
fundamentalism.  While many politicians on the right remained relatively silent, the 
left was deeply split on the issue of headscarves (Bowen 2007:84).  Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin and President François Mitterrand tried to avoid taking a stand on either 
side of the issue (85).  A High Council on Integration was created, and the issued was 
passed on to the Conseil d’Etat for a decision.  In November, the Conseil ruled that 
the girls could wear their headscarves as long as they did not disturb school life 
(L’Express 30 April 2003). 
Samira, Fatima and Leila were not the only three girls affected by this affair, 
as there were similar expulsions elsewhere in France.  Some teachers went on strike 
to protest against allowing scarf-wearing students in class.  Although several appeals 
cases were brought to the Conseil d’Etat over the next few years, the 1989 decision 
on headscarves was upheld unless the school could prove that the girl in question was 
often absent, proselytized, or refused to remove her scarf for gym and chemistry 
classes.  There were no further general rulings, as the issue was seen as a problem 
best handled on a case by case basis (Bowen 2007:87). 
1994 Headscarf Affair 
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Just as in 1989, contemporary events helped to set the stage for a new round 
of headscarf debates in 1993-4.  This time, however, these dangerous events were 
much closer to home than Iran.  In Algeria in the early 1990s there was mounting 
tension and violence between the military and new Islamic movements.  One of these 
movements, called the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), had been created in 1989.  
During the first round of elections in early 1992 the military denied FIS’s victory and 
the elections were cancelled.  In response, many FIS supporters became more 
radicalized, and the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) was created (Bowen 2007:89).  
These events sparked off what is now referred to as the Algerian Civil War (1992-
1998).  In early August 1994 Charles Pasqua, France’s Interior Minister, launched a 
security crackdown on “bad” neighborhoods in France after a few French citizens 
were killed in Algiers.  Many French Muslim public figures of Algerian origin were 
arrested (90).  Once again, the media intertwined coverage of the forthcoming 
headscarf affairs with that of the continued fighting in Algeria.     
In the 1993-4 school year, new cases of expulsions arose.  Those in Nantua 
and Grenoble were the most heavily covered by the media.  In Nantua, four girls of 
Turkish and Moroccan origins were expelled for refusing to remove their headscarves 
in gym class, though they were allowed to keep their scarves in class during the rest 
of the day.  Teachers went on strike while the disciplinary hearings were going on 
because they considered the veil to pose safety concerns in gym and chemistry 
classes.  In addition, they thought that veiling was segregationist and discriminatory 
against women.  This affair was made even worse when the girls’ families spoke for 
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them in public and two self-proclaimed Islamic “authorities” said that Islam required 
the veiling of women (Bowen 2007:87).   
In Grenoble, a girl named Schérazade discovered Islam during the summer 
before her final year of high school.  She had read the Qur’an in French and decided 
to convert.  She also convinced her father to return to practicing Islam.  Like the four 
girls in Nantua, Schérazade was expelled because she refused to take off her scarf in 
gym class.  After she tried to appeal her expulsion and lost, she went on a twenty-one 
day hunger strike while in an RV in front of her school.  This event received 
worldwide press attention (88).   
These two cases renewed arguments about the headscarf, girls and the 
exercise of personal religious freedom.  While Schérazade’s case supported the view 
that girls who wear headscarves had autonomy, the four girls in Nantua were seen as 
deprived of it, mainly due to the fact that their parents and religious “authorities” 
spoke on their behalf.  The girls’ seemingly large amount of legal knowledge about 
the headscarf issue was used as evidence of either manipulation of the girls or of their 
ability to obey French laws and remain Muslim (88).  Ernest Chénière, now a deputy 
in the National Assembly, warned that laïcité had been compromised (88-9).  
François Bayrou, the Minister of Education, issued a directive in September 1994 
banning ostentatious symbols from schools, including all headscarves.  Scarves were 
seen to “take certain pupils outside the rules for living together in the school.”  Many 
teachers strongly supported this directive (89).   
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As a result, the number of expulsions due to headscarves went from the low 
hundreds up to about two thousand.  A new ministerial mediator, Hanifa Chérifi, 
herself of Kabyle origin, was appointed to deal with the headscarf cases.  Those who 
had been against scarves in 1989 felt vindicated.  Some compared headscarves to 
Nazi or Stalinist uniforms, and some teachers even said that they could not have what 
was happening in Algeria happen in France (91).   
Due to the high number of headscarf expulsions in Lyon, a group of girls—led 
in part by Saïda Kada—started the Union of Lyon Muslim Sisters in 1995 to organize 
classes for expelled girls outside of school.  They enlisted the help of volunteer 
teachers and raised money to pay for the teachers, transportation for the girls, and 
enrollment fees for distance learning.  Some girls took their former schools to court, 
where some of them were able to get their expulsions reversed if they could prove 
that they were only expelled for wearing the scarf (91).   
Over the next few years, the number of incidents fell to about 150 per year 
(92).   Chérifi, the state’s mediator on headscarf expulsion cases, was generally quite 
lenient.  Rather than automatically supporting one side of the dispute, she would try 
to convince both sides to find some sort of compromise that was mutually acceptable 
(89).     
2003-4 Headscarf Affair 
The dangers of Islam came under media scrutiny once again in France during 
the late 1990s when there were several bombing attacks (which led to the creation of 
antiterrorist initiatives) and an overall fear of ghettoization in the suburbs, or 
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banlieues (Bowen 2007:92).  The amalgamation of Islam with terrorism was made 
worse in 1995, when France instituted Vigipirate anti-terrorist measures that 
constituted “Arabs” as a national security threat (Silverstein 2004:130).  The terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 further increased the existing fears of Islam, as 
Samuel Huntington’s ideas on the “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West 
(1996) became more and more widespread.  Attempts to explain such polarization 
became intrinsically linked to anxieties about non-white immigrants in Western 
Europe and the United States (Hanson 2007:20).   
In a now familiar pattern, these fears of Islam were once again tied to the issue 
of the headscarf.  In March 2002 a scarf incident in a school in Seine-Saint-Denis, 
north of Paris, marked a change in tone by Hanifa Chérifi: “[W]e have neglected the 
intrinsic significance of the voile: to remind women, starting at puberty, that Islamic 
morality forbids the mixing of the sexes in all public spaces, including the school” 
(Bowen 2007:93).  There were also several minor scarf affairs in late 2002.  One girl 
in Lyon was suspended for wearing a headscarf and was then readmitted.  When one 
of her cousins also began to veil teachers voiced fear of a contagion of scarves (ibid.).   
In a separate case during January of the following year, a school 
superintendent refused disciplinary proceedings to a scarf-wearing student because he 
did not want her to become a victim.  Teachers at the school (in La Martinière) 
threatened to strike over this refusal, but the superintendent urged them to meet with 
him and the rector of the Lyon mosque (94). The teachers considered the rector’s 
involvement to be wholly inappropriate and refused to meet with him.  80% of 
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teachers went on strike in March (95).  According to Hanifa Chérifi, who had been 
called in to help with the case, originally only three teachers had been against the 
covered girl’s presence; other teachers simply followed their lead.  Each of the 
original three teachers had had a previous bad experience with Islam.  Eventually the 
education minister told the superintendent that he could not meet with the rector.  The 
superintendent then agreed to meet with the teachers and the strike was called off 
(Bowen 2007:95).   
Politicians, the media and the French public became more sensitized to the 
issue of headscarves partly as a result of these relatively minor scarf affairs, and 
partly as a result of Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy’s inflammatory speech at the 
Salon du Bourget, a large annual gathering of French Muslims, in April 2003.  In this 
speech, Sarkozy spoke of the need for veiled women to remove their headscarves for 
identity photographs.  He also criticized religious associations that skirted the 
Republic’s laws on laïcité by registering with the government as cultural associations 
(L’Humanité 22 April 2003).    
In such a charged political environment, journalists and politicians only 
needed to wait for a scarf affair to occur and serve as a focus for these debates.  They 
got one at the Henri-Wallon high school in Aubervilliers, a northeastern suburb of 
Paris.  Alma and Lila Lévy, aged 16 and 18 respectively, came to school in 
headscarves in September 2003.  Their teachers asked them to leave, but the principal 
wanted the girls to remain at school.  The girls’ Jewish last name led to many worries 
about the increasing rate of conversions to Islam, but in reality their father, Laurent 
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Lévy, was a lawyer for MRAP (Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre 
les Peuples) and a Jewish atheist, while their mother was Kabyle (Libération 24 
September 2003).  The Lévy sisters were expelled in late September when they 
refused to wear a light scarf (couvre-chef) in place of their headscarves (foulards).  
Thirty-four out of thirty-six students in their class voted to strike in support of the 
Lévy sisters (Bowen 2007:111).   
Several politicians began to discuss the possible need for a law banning 
headscarves and other religious symbols altogether.  Sarkozy himself was against 
such a law because it targeted Muslims.  He proposed a policy of “positive 
discrimination” to reestablish equal opportunity and lessen the resentment that lay 
behind the wearing of headscarves and the support for political Islam (105).  Prime 
Minister Raffarin was indecisive, and Education Minister Luc Ferry wavered back 
and forth on the possible need for a law (106), though at first he was in favor of a ban 
on headscarves in schools (Libération 23 April 2003).  In a May 2003 unofficial 
report requested by Prime Minister Raffarin, Francois Baroin recommended a law to 
defend laïcité against the multiculturalism of the Left and “certain immigrant 
populations.”  The National Assembly made its own commission, called the 
Parliamentary Information Mission on Religious Signs, headed by Jean-Louis Debré 
(Bowen 2007:106; Debré 2003).  Most socialists were in favor of a law, along with 
Muslim advocates of laïcité and secular Muslims (107).   
The UOIF (Union of Islamic Organizations of France) and FNMF (National 
Federation of French Muslims) were both opposed to such a ban, as they thought it 
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would target Muslims and restrict their religious freedoms (Libération 13 December 
2003).  Tariq Ramadan, a popular yet controversial Muslim intellectual in France, 
was also opposed to a law on similar grounds, arguing that France needed to focus on 
the real problems of Muslims and create dialogue between different religious and 
ethnic communities (Libération 7 May 2003).   
Prominent figures and representatives from other religious communities in 
France were also against to the proposed law banning headscarves in public schools.  
This included Mgr Olivier de Berranger, bishop of Saint-Denis, and Cardinal Jean-
Marie Lustiger, Archbishop of Paris (Le Figaro 13 October 2003; Agence France 
Presse 15 January 2004).  The bishops of France also took a strong stance against 
such a proposed law during their meeting at Lourdes (Le Figaro 10 November 2003).  
The Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF) and the Liberal 
Jewish Movement of France (MJLF) were also opposed to the law (Agence France 
Presse 11 December 2003).  
The proposed law was also heavily criticized by French teachers and many 
important French intellectuals.  Three of the four major teacher’s unions were 
opposed to the law’s stigmatization of part of the French population (Le Monde 18 
December 2003).  The SNI-PEGC (National Union of Teacher-Professors of General 
Education of Collèges (equivalent to junior high schools in the United States), the 
SNES (National Union of Second Degree Education) and the FEN (Federation of 
National Education) were also opposed to the law (L’Humanité 4 November 2003), as 
were several prominent parental organizations (L’Unapel, or the Union of Parents of 
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Private School Students, and the FCPE, or the Federation of Parents of Students 
Councils: La Croix 28 November 2003).  While Elisabeth Badinter, a prominent 
French feminist, was in favor of a law (La Croix 25 June 2003), philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur was opposed to it, even going so far to name this “the laïcité of exclusion” 
(Le Monde 11 December 2003).   
President Jacques Chirac appointed the Stasi Commission on laïcité (named 
after its leader, Bernard Stasi) in July 2003 (Bowen 2007:112).2  Although most of 
the members of this commission did not originally favor a law banning religious 
symbols, in the end eighteen of them, with one abstention, voted in favor of such a 
law (Libération 13 December 2003).  During the commission’s hearings those who 
testified depicted the situation in French schools as out of hand and argued that 
something had to be done.  Nobody was very sure that a law would help much, 
though (Bowen 2007:113; Libération 19 November 2003).   
The commission seemed to assume that there was a link between the veil, 
Islam, violence against women and the breakdown of order in the schools.  The 
choice of people to hear and the questions asked suggested these linkages.  John 
Bowen, who witnessed these hearings, reports that the members of the commission 
listened closely to teachers and principals but were suspicious of the Muslims who 
testified.  None of the expelled girls were allowed to speak, and there was no 
testimony from sociologists who had studied veiling, the banlieues or Muslims in 
France (Bowen 2007:117).  Saïda Kada, one of the leaders of the Union of Lyon 
Muslim Sisters, an organization to help educate girls who had been expelled from 
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school due to their headscarves, was the only veiled Muslim woman who testified.  
During her testimony they asked her a lot of questions about the veil, the reasons that 
Muslims do this or that, and attacked her for encouraging girls to leave school and not 
adapting to society (118).   
The Stasi Commission issued its report on December 11, 2003.  Many of its 
recommendations were too general to be useful.  Some of the more concrete 
suggestions were to forbid hospital patients from refusing to be treated by a doctor of 
the opposite sex, to make Aïd al-Kebir and Yom Kippur national holidays, and to 
pass a law banning signs of political and religious affiliation in public schools—
specifically large crosses, yarmulkes and headscarves (Agence France Presse 11 
December 2003; Stasi 2003).   
By December public support was behind the law, partly as a result of constant 
media coverage in the previous months (Bowen 2007:124-6).  President Jacques 
Chirac proposed a law against religious signs in public schools on December 17, 2003 
(Agence France Presse 17 December 2003).  Following this proposal there were three 
large demonstrations against the law on December 21, January 17 and February 14 
(Libération 22 December 2003; 19 January 2004; Bowen 2007:129).  During the first 
week of February 2004 the National Assembly debated the law for four days (133).  It 
was clear that most of the deputies had previously agreed to pass some sort of law.  
Everyone wanted to go on the record in support of laïcité and against Islamism (135-
6).  After both the Assembly and the Senate passed the law without any problems or 
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significant changes (Le Temps 11 February 2004), the Education Ministry issued an 
administrative order enforcing the ban on May 18, 2004 (Bowen 2007:140).   
Through analyzing these debates and discussions of headscarves and the 
situation of North African migrants and French Muslims, as well as the surrounding 
context of French laïcité, multiculturalism, Europeanization and globalization, we see 
that the headscarf serves as a useful tool and medium for the maintenance and 
expression of power and social boundaries (following Lamont 2000) for both the 
dominated and the dominators in France.  These two categories are distinguished by 
their possession of various types of capital, though economic capital is the most 
important.  On the one hand, the dominated have little power to create their own 
symbolic production and have difficulty expressing their own point of view in social 
space (Bourdieu 1991:244).  They are reduced to using the symbols and ways of 
expressing their point of view that are available to them within the system of their 
domination.  The headscarf is just such a loaded, multi-layered symbol of importance 
to the formerly colonial system of domination that has been expropriated to express 
North African migrant and French Muslim points of view within the current system 
of domination itself.3   
On the other hand, banning the headscarf became a way to direct symbolic 
and structural violence against France’s minorities in order to create and solidify 
French national identity in an environment of uncertainty.  Arjun Appadurai’s 
concept of predatory identities, which require the destruction of other nearby 
identities, proves useful here.  Predatory identities commonly stem from pairs of 
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identities with histories of mixture, close contact and mutual stereotyping (2006:51).  
French colonialism in North Africa created such an environment of mutually 
implicated identities that became further entangled and intertwined with North 
African immigration to France.   
Before I begin the main body of this investigation, I will briefly address the 
issue of categorization of people and terminology in France.  First I will address 
official categories, followed by socially constructed categories and their respective 
usages. 
The French census categorizes individuals as French by birth, foreigners, or 
immigrants (Keaton 2006:48, citing INSEE 1999).  “French by birth” indicates 
anyone who was born on French soil, and who has thereby automatically acquired 
French citizenship.   For this purpose, “French soil” refers not only to France itself, 
but also to its overseas departments and territories (such as Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
or Reunion: Hifi 1985:13).  The ethnic or national origins of the “French by birth” are 
not investigated, leaving it very difficult or impossible to document the descendants 
of immigrants (Keaton 2006:48).  “Foreigner” (étranger) refers to people living in 
France who are citizens of independent foreign nations (Hifi 1985:15).  As for 
“immigrant,” this term refers to persons who were born off of French soil and who 
have acquired French citizenship through the process of naturalization (Keaton 
2006:48).  In other terms, this category of usage of “immigrant” would encompass 
only the first generation of migrants, since their children and grandchildren would be 
born in France and thereby be officially considered “French by birth.” 
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With the exception of “French by birth,” the terms for the social categories of 
people in France overlap those of the official categories.  This is what, in part, leads 
to such confusion about who belongs to what category and what that category tells us 
about the person.   
The socially constructed category of “of French stock” (français de souche) 
refers to phenotypically white French with ostensibly pure European ancestry.  The 
term “immigrant” collapses together both foreign-born, “original” immigrants and 
their children and grandchildren.  A person is seen as an immigrant by virtue of their 
foreign origin (which in turn depends on the international position of their country of 
origin) and it evokes a particular social condition more than a legal status (Hifi 
1985:13).  As a stigma the term “immigrant” refers to not only foreigners, but 
foreigners of the lowest social condition (14).    
In an effort to be as precise as possible and to avoid these pitfalls and 
confusions of official and social classification, I will use “North African migrant” to 
designate the first generation migrant laborers in France.  “French Muslims” will be 
used to denote the second or third generation descendants of these migrants, although 
it should be noted that not everyone in this category is necessarily a practicing 
Muslim.  It should also be noted that many of France’s Muslims are of West African 
or Turkish origin.  I do not treat either of these groups in this work for several 
reasons.  First of all, although French Muslims from North Africa, Turkey and West 
Africa may share a common religion, their cultures, histories and identities, including 
the ways that they practice and think about Islam, are significantly different.  Rather 
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than inadequately addressing all of these communities in France, I have chosen to 
focus on adequately addressing only one of them.   
I would also like to make some brief comments on race and racism in France.  
Although France has long been considered a truly colorblind society where racism 
does not exist (Keaton 2006:22), and French themselves do not see their society as 
racist (Lamont 2000:191), this is not the case.  Racism in France is framed along 
cultural and religious arguments, since race is not based on the same genetic and 
biological explanations in France as it is in the United States (ibid.). Blacks are not 
the main focus of racism in France because they have more heterogeneous origins and 
religious self-identifications and they make up a smaller group than North Africans.   
In addition, sub-Saharan Africa had a more peaceful decolonization (192-3).  As 
Keaton points out, people of color in France are supposedly discriminated against 
because they are “immigrants” or foreigners, not because they are “black” (citing De 
Rudder, Poiret and Vourc’h 2000).  “But the fact that a thing is not racially named 
does not mean it is not racialized” (2006:8).  The reluctance to address issues of racial 
and ethnic discrimination partially stems from the fact that “such classifications are 
viewed through perceptions shaped during the Vichy regime and still conjure up 
dreaded memories and images of ethnic labeling in France during the Nazi era” 
(ibid.).  It is also linked to racially, ethnically and religiously based classification 
systems that were commonly used under colonial rule by other European imperialist 
states, not just France (see Anderson 2003:166).   
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  Despite this cultural and religious emphasis, phenotypically-based 
discrimination does occur.  Racial profiling of blacks, as well as North Africans and 
anyone who is phenotypically distinguishable from the white majority, is routine 
(191).  While conducting fieldwork in France, Trica Keaton (herself an African-
American woman who speaks French without an accent) experienced this profiling 
first-hand.  She was “selectively made” to show her tickets while on commuter trains, 
followed in department stores and supermarkets, and made to show her papers even 
though she was doing nothing suspicious (Keaton 2006:22).   
In this thesis, I am most concerned with the 2004 ban on religious symbols, 
and specifically of headscarves.  I also bring in wider issues and information about 
North African migrants and French Muslims to highlight some of the concepts and 
issues at hand in these debates.  This work is fundamentally based on library research 
rather than fieldwork.  I will not cover information about what Islam or the Qur’an 
does or does not say about headscarves and women, what veiling really means and 
whether or not it is oppressive.  Furthermore, limits of time and length do not allow 
me to fully address France’s colonial history in and with North Africa, although this 
certainly colors the debates about immigration and headscarves in France.  In essence, 
I am much more interested in and concerned with what the headscarf issue can tell us 
about France and about its place in the world than in what it can tell us about women 
and Islam. 
Chapter 2 investigates the French concept of secularism, or laïcité, and traces 
the challenges of multiculturalism in France.  I address the question of why the 
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headscarf debates and issues of immigration emerged in the late 20th century in 
Chapter 3, before moving on to my analysis of the headscarf debates and conclusions 
in Chapter 4. 
                                                 
1 Marnia Lazreg (1994) explores this, along with other aspects of colonial feminism in Algeria.  Lila 
Abu-Lughod discusses the involvement of feminism, imperialism and unveiling in her 2002 article as 
well.   
2 Consisting of Bernard Stasi, Mohammed Arkoun, Jean Baubérot, Hanifa Chérifi, Jacqueline Costa-
Lascoux, Régis Debray, Michel Delebarre, Nicole Guedj, Ghislaine Hudson, Gilles Kepel, Marceau 
Long, Nelly Olin, Henri Peña-Ruiz, Gaye Petek, Maurice Quenet, Rémy Schwartz, Raymond Subie, 
Alain Touraine, and Patrick Weil (Le Monde 12 December 2003). 
3 Malek Alloula (1986), Marnia Lazreg (1994), Meyda Yegenoglu (1998) and Fadwa El-Guindi (1999) 
all address the symbolic use of unveiling and the veil in colonial endeavors in the Middle East and 
North Africa. 
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Chapter 2: Laïcité and Multiculturalism 
In order to understand the headscarf debates in France, it is crucial to examine 
and understand the concept of laïcité.  First, I will discuss French ideas about laïcité 
and the proposed relationship between religion and the state.  After widening this 
discussion to include the state’s attitude towards difference of any kind, I will 
examine how concerns about the processes of inclusion and exclusion repeat those of 
the Third Republic (1871-1914).  Finally I will examine the French state’s view of 
multiculturalism and how France has used the 2004 ban on religious symbols in the 
public education system to deal with France’s increasingly pluriethnic composition. 
In “Does French Islam Have Borders?” John R. Bowen makes a distinction 
between political and social laïcité.  While the former forbids the state from imposing 
a particular religion (or allowing any religion to be imposed) and is concerned with 
the separation of politics and religion, social laïcité pertains to the privatization of 
religious affiliation, and the religious neutrality of the public sphere (2004:46).  
Throughout this chapter, I will focus primarily on social laïcité.     
Although in France it is often seen as an absolute principle to be supported, 
upheld or redefined, laïcité is actually a socially and culturally constructed concept 
(Amselle 2003:103) that is constantly redefined and reshaped by its cultural 
environment and its sociological uses. Laïcité is interpreted as an absolute principle in 
France partly because of its strong (perceived) connections to the founding principles 
of the French Revolution and republican government.  In this view, assimilation to 
French national and cultural identity (or “integration,” as it is commonly referred to in 
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French national discourse) implies accepting a more privatized form of religious 
belief and practice, as well as generally having a less intense religiosity (Bowen 2004: 
45, citing Tribalat 1995).   
In the French public imagination, both the level of intrusion of Islamic 
religious practice into public space and the intensity of this practice are marked and 
measured by headscarves.  Through its very presence the headscarf is a visible 
representation of Islamic religious belief.1  It should be noted that the body itself is 
also a visible representation of belief, and a site for struggles between the French state 
and individual agents “to ensure the social reproduction of local and national forms of 
identity and belonging” (Silverstein 2004:123).  Like the French Muslim body itself, 
the headscarf has been semantically transformed by its media representations as a 
scarf (foulard), a wrap or cover (hijab), a veil and a chador.  “With each 
transformation, the piece of fabric looked more and more sinister, more and more 
like, in the words of the former French ambassador to UNESCO Gisèle Halimi, ‘the 
flag of fundamentalism’” (146, quoting Le Monde 30 November 1989).   
Furthermore, the way that Muslims react in conflicts over the headscarf is 
seen to mark the intensity of their belief.  While those with less intense religious 
belief (which is a sign of acculturation to French norms and values, and therefore 
more acceptable) make little or no fuss over the ability to wear headscarves in French 
public schools, those Muslims who have fought hardest and longest to allow 
headscarves in the schools have the most (unacceptably) intense religious affiliation.  
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In effect, intensely expressed religious affiliation is also expressed non-affiliation 
with French culture and norms. 
Following Clifford Geertz’s view that small facts speak to larger issues 
(2005:112), I would like to begin my examination of laïcité by looking at two French 
words: culte and religion.  Vianney Sevaistre, former Chief of the Central Office of 
Organized Religions, said that “[t]here is no legal definition of culte.  You know, the 
word ‘religion’ (religion) has no place in French law.  Religion has to do with the 
relationship of the individual to God.  Le culte is the outward expression of that 
relationship” (Bowen 2007:17).  This seemingly small distinction between two words 
points to the larger distinction in France between private and public forms of religious 
practice and belief.  As we will see, this distinction is mainly the result of the French 
understanding of secularism and the social contract.   
As Talal Asad points out, the modern secular state’s categorization of sacred 
and secular removes the truly sacred from public life and lived experience to an 
abstracted or imagined humanity (2003:143).  This process of abstraction is 
accompanied in France by an increasing privatization and individualization of 
religious practice.  The abstraction and privatization of religious belief and practice 
stem from the state’s efforts to avoid religious strife.  “[B]y removing all religious 
observance from public institutions the private religious divides that exist in society 
should be overcome” (Freedman 2004:130-1).   
In order to understand how individual religious belief, as exemplified in the 
French term religion, could be dangerous to the existence of French society and/or the 
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French state, we must first examine the conceptions of society and the state 
themselves more carefully.  During and after the French Revolution of 1789, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s ideas of the social contract and civil religion were critical to the 
formation and conception of France as a Republic.   
For nearly two centuries before Rousseau published Du contrat social in 1762 
Europe had been ravaged by religious wars.  One of Rousseau’s main aims was to 
explain why these wars happened, why they had been so intensely violent, and what 
could be done to prevent the same thing from happening in the future.  Rousseau 
thought that this intolerance and violence ultimately stemmed from the existence of 
societal and national divisions:    
because a God was set at the head of every separate political society, it 
followed that there must needs be as many Gods as Peoples…Thus, from 
national divisions came polytheism, and thence developed theological and 
civil intolerance—the two being naturally the same thing (Rousseau 
1947:296). 
 
For Rousseau, the fundamental problem with religion2 in general (and 
Christianity in particular) is the disconnection between religion’s sacred authority and 
the secular authority of the state.  Since the time of Christ, “the sacred cult has 
remained, or once more become, independent of the sovereign, and is without any 
true bond of union with the body of the State” and it is difficult to establish whether 
people owe their obedience to the ruler or to the priest (299).  Autonomous, free-
standing, “priestly” religion “result[ed in] a sort of mixed and unsocial law which has 
no name” (301).   
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According to Blandine Kriegel, this view of the relationship between church 
and state differs significantly from the “Anglo-Saxon” model.  The latter is founded 
on the idea of freedom of the individual conscience elaborated by John Locke and 
Baruch Spinoza.  The “Anglo-Saxon” model of the separation of church and state is 
conceived of in terms of the need to protect the individual’s freedom of conscience 
from political power and its ability to impose a single religion.  On the contrary, in 
France, “these liberties are guaranteed through political power, which guarantees a 
public space that is neutral with respect to religion” (Bowen 2007:14, emphasis 
added).   
From the French point of view, the “Anglo-Saxon” version of secularism and 
the separation of church and state is rather flimsy.  Although it is well supported by 
important documents, such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, 
in practice the wall that separates church and state has many doors, according to 
Emile Poulat (1987:160).  This insubstantial separation is evidenced by the fact that 
the Supreme Court has had to clarify various aspects of the First Amendment many 
times over the years.  The presence of religion and prayer in schools, the mention of 
God in the Pledge of Allegiance, a lack of standardization between different states’ 
rules about religion and God, and the printing of “In God We Trust” on American 
money also support this claim of a weak American commitment to secularism (161).   
For many in France, the United States is just such a case of “mixed and 
unsocial law” resulting from an unseparated and unspecified relationship between 
religion and the state feared by Rousseau.  In order to fight this dangerously 
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autonomous status of religion, Rousseau prescribes a particular relationship between 
religion and the state.  According to him,  
It is of considerable concern to the State whether a citizen professes a religion 
which leads him to live his duties.  But the dogmas of that religion are of no 
interest to the State or to its members except as they have a bearing on the 
morals and duties which the citizen professing it should hold and perform in 
dealing with others.  That consideration apart, it is open to each to entertain 
what opinions he pleases, and it is no part of the business of the State to have 
cognizance of them, since, not being competent in the affairs of the other 
world, no matter what be the fate of its members in the life to come, it has no 
sort of concern with such matters, provided the citizen fulfils his duties in this 
one (305, emphasis added). 
 
In essence, Rousseau argues that, as far as the state is concerned, religion 
makes no difference as long as the citizen lives up to his or her obligations to the 
state.  To help insure the fulfillment of these duties, Rousseau proposes a civil 
profession of faith.  This should be a “body of social sentiments without which no 
man can be either a good citizen or a faithful subject.”  These sentiments should be 
outlined by the state (305).  In order to protect itself, the state can banish those who 
do not believe in it because they are “lacking in social sense, and…incapable of 
sincerely loving the laws and justice, or of sacrificing, should the need arise, their 
lives to their duty” (306).  As I mentioned previously, intensely expressed religious 
affiliation is also seen as expressed non-affiliation with French culture and norms—
including the social contract itself.  Muslim girls in France who wear the headscarf, as 
well as North African migrants and French Muslims in general, are accused of just 
such disbelief in the French state. 
Shifting the individual right to belief out of the purview of the state was 
intended to protect an individual’s autonomy from a sovereign state within the 
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context of that state (Asad 2003:134).  The state must maintain its commitment to 
universal values by allowing the same rights to all citizens.  In return for this 
protection of universal values and the right to individual sovereignty, the individual 
has to make certain concessions to the state.  This agreement of individuals to limit 
their sovereignty out of a concern for the greater good of society is expressed in the 
social contract.   
Although other Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke and Thomas 
Hobbes came up with rather similar ideas of the social contract, Rousseau has had the 
biggest influence on current French ideas about society and the state.  How does this 
view of the social contract and the proper relationship between religion and the state 
explain and cope with conflict?  According to French revolutionary ideology, when 
society fails to change according to the general will the  problem lies with hostile 
opposite wills and not with the shifting, indecisive nature of society itself (Berger 
1990:58).   Hence it is important for the state to limit the expressions of opposing 
wills and to foster an environment that encourages social consensus.   
Although I have focused on the privatization of religious expressions and 
beliefs so far, it is important to remember that the individual should give up any 
particularist, or opposing, interests.  This includes ethnic or regional practices and 
beliefs, as well as religious ones.3  As Arjun Appadurai points out, the existence of 
particular interests, or “small numbers,” strikes fear into the heart of a universalist 
state.  These interests raise the specters of conspiracy, the cell, the spy, the traitor, the 
dissident, and the revolutionary (2006:62).  In order to be considered a good citizen, 
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one must share the same culture as other citizens.  Potential good citizens originally 
from other cultures must at least outwardly exhibit this cultural homogeneity and 
refrain from emphasizing their cultural differences.  Even if such differences exist, it 
is inappropriate for the state to recognize, let alone promote, such differences.   
Even asking questions about religious and ethnic differences is seen to be 
dangerous and improper.  Overall the French state is unwilling to collect statistical 
information about its minorities (whether religious or cultural).4  Questions about 
ethnic or religious identity are not even asked, thus insuring that the state’s neutrality 
(and thus the universal equality of rights and social cohesion) is maintained. For 
example, the census, the labor force, and other surveys only distinguish between 
French nationals and foreigners (Hargreaves 1995:39).  However, this invisibility is a 
catch-22.  Although it protects universal rights, this lack of information also renders it 
nearly impossible to prove or monitor the violation of these rights along religious or 
ethnic lines (Hargreaves 2007). It also leaves the door wide open for lying about the 
existence, size and distribution of the nation’s minorities (Favell 1998:160). 
 This lack of information and uncertainty in regards to France’s ethnic and 
religious compositions leads to other social consequences as well.  In response to 
such ambiguity, people begin to suspect that everyday labels hide dangerous 
collective identities (Appadurai 1998:229).  In France the situation is particularly 
uncomfortable, because most of the obviously non-European people (who are 
assumed to be non-French) are migrants (or their descendants) from its former 
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colonies in North and West Africa, as well as Southeast Asia.  Their very presence 
raises the additional concerns tied to the colonial past.  
In extreme cases, these dangerous identities are handled by ethnocide, while 
in other cases collective identities are dissolved by some form of social death 
(Appadurai 2006:88).  This need not mean physical violence, since social existence 
“means also to be perceived, and perceived as distinct” (Bourdieu 1991:224).  
Following this logic, failure or refusal to recognize a community as distinct erases its 
existence.   
In addition to the de facto erasure of differences, the state also emphasizes the 
singularity and all-encompassing nature of French identity itself.  Integration into 
French society (and acculturation to French identity) is only possible through the 
achievement of full membership, or citizenship, in that society (Favell 1998:65).  
Those who are not fully integrated into French society in this way are lumped 
together as immigrants (immigrés) or as foreigners (étrangers: 73).  Liberty within 
the social contract effectively depends at a deeper level on accepting society’s norms 
as one’s own.  This acceptance must be demonstrated not only by proving that one 
has “good morals” and can speak the language of their new country, but also by 
agreeing to follow the laws of the new country.  In France, this includes following the 
laws (and thereby the principles that underlie them) about laïcité (81-2, see also 
Hargreaves 1995).   
 This emphasis on cultural homogeneity has been called “cultural 
fundamentalism” (Stolcke 1995:8) and is based on the assumption that there is a one-
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to-one-to-one ratio between nation, society and state.  Following Benedict Anderson, 
a nation is a political community that is imagined as limited and sovereign.  These 
nations are invented where they did not previously exist through the process of 
nationalism (1983:15).  Nationalism took concrete shape through various institutions, 
such as print capitalism (Chatterjee 1993:4).  In fact, all national movements are 
really coalitions of older communities and cultures that are unified through the 
selection and accumulation of memories, cosmologies, tales, and genealogies to 
create a unified historical narrative (Anderson 2003:183).  Through the creation, 
recreation and emphasis of cultural sameness, France is highlighting and reinforcing 
its national identity and the ideal connection of nation, society and state.  This focus 
on the national ethnos is closely connected to the strong, centralized view of the state 
in Jacobin tradition.  In order to be a true, full member of a society, the individual 
must be a member of this nation and have a strong commitment to the state.   
This “franco-conformity” (Keaton 2006:100) and its acts of inclusion 
inherently entail the exclusion of some identities.  As Mary Douglas points out, 
society is form surrounded by formlessness (1966: 98).  This form is not a primordial 
given; it must be created and constantly enforced through the processes of inclusion 
and exclusion.  This arbitrary process of boundary creation and enforcement is itself 
naturalized (Foster 1991:236-7).  In this case, those who are perceived as non-(white) 
French are the targets of exclusionary practices that aim to create and enforce French 
identity.  This creation of French or any other European identity is not about making 
changes in the legal definitions of rights and obligations, nor is it about creating a 
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broader, more inclusive supranational definition of Europe.  As Talal Asad puts it, “it 
concerns exclusions and the desire that those excluded recognize what is included in 
the name one has chosen for oneself.  The discourse of European identity is a 
symptom of anxieties about non-Europeans” (Asad 2003: 161).  It is just as important 
for people to define and recognize what they are not (i.e., to chose an exclusionary 
identity) as it is to define and what they are.     
These anxieties are merely new transformations of old fears regarding social 
division, identities and inequalities.  In the first years of the Third Republic (1871-
1914) there were many efforts to return to fundamental republican ideals and national 
reconsolidation after the devastating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 
(Bowen 2007:24).  Fear of (mainly regional) particularist identities and social discord 
were part of this emphasis on reconsolidating national identity.  This consolidation 
was conducted primarily through education (although changes in nationality rules 
were also involved).  Jules Ferry, the driving force behind the creation of the French 
educational system, saw equal education as a way to suppress social discord before it 
started (Legrand 1961:100).  The understanding of French nationhood was reinforced 
by a kind of internal mission civilisatrice conducted by an army of schoolteachers 
(Brubaker 1992:108).   
As one of the main sources for social discord, the role of religion in French 
society and education needed to be limited and clearly delineated.  Unlike in the 
United States, where religion was kept out of schools out of concern for religious 
freedom, in France secular education was intended to remove education from the 
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hands of the Church.  Since it rejected the basic principles of the Republic, the 
Church could not be trusted to educate the young (Beriss 1990:3).  Positivism5 also 
contributed to this perceived need for secular education.  Jules Ferry thought that the 
positivist concern with moving beyond a theological or metaphysical frame of mind 
necessitated creating a system of free, obligatory and laic education and carefully 
limiting the role of parochial schools (118).  In many ways, the proposed role of the 
state and of religion in education mirrored Rousseau’s prescriptions for the roles of 
state and religion.  For Ferry,  
The Assemblies are not made to promulgate theological credos of whatever 
nature.  That is not your role; thus I am opposed to this pretension of not 
accepting the aim, taken from nature and from the essence from our laic 
society and the spirit of our French Revolution, which had no other aim than 
to clearly separate the domain of conscience from that of terrestrial and 
temporal government” (Robiquet 1893, cited in Legrand 1961:140-1, 
emphasis added).   
 
Laicization was not merely a top-down change in French society instituted by 
the elites.  Ever since the Revolution, religion had become outmoded and useless to 
the average rural Frenchman as well.  While attendance at Church was obligatory 
until the French Revolution, the political turmoil and schisms of the 1790s combined 
with the lack of access to priests or pastors to let the importance of Church attendance 
fall away.  Between then and 1801 (when Napoleon signed an agreement with the 
Catholic Church that reinstated much of its pre-Revolutionary power in France) many 
young people grew up without religion as a strong presence in their lives (Weber 
1976:341).  The Revolution also made priests more economically dependent on their 
parishioners, which increased tensions between villagers and priests (342).  Urban 
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Frenchmen were also implicated in these changes.  Migrant laborers returning from 
the city brought back the possibility of nonconformity to religious practices (343).  In 
addition, the Church’s close affiliations with the upper classes were increasingly 
noticed and resented in the 19th century (360).  Drastic changes in the material 
conditions for religious belief and participation also led to the decreasing importance 
of religion (370). 
This tense transition from primarily religious self-understanding to national 
identification and community is mirrored in Benedict Anderson’s description of the 
emergence of nationalism and imagined national communities (Anderson 1983:22).  
Although Anderson is speaking about Europe in general, this shift from religious to 
national identification was particularly strong in France, as Weber clearly shows.  
While religious communities were centrally and hierarchically organized, national 
communities were more boundary-oriented and horizontally organized (ibid.).  The 
religious community became fragmented, pluralistic and territorialized (25). These 
fragmentary, territorialized communities opened up the space for the formation of 
new national communities.   
In response to these shifts from religious to national communities and 
identities, the French government passed several educational reforms and instituted a 
policy of laïcité.  On March 28, 1882 the Chamber approved a law that established 
public education as free, obligatory and laic.  In addition, the principles of state laïcité 
were firmly established in a 1905 law.  Teacher training was also overhauled by the 
1882 law (Bowen 2007:25-6).   
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The teacher’s role in society and the nation grew in importance at this time.  
The republican ideal of equal rights and freedom of conscience allowed everyone to 
have the opportunity to be teachers, rather than merely a select few clergy members.  
In fact, teachers often adopted the social roles vacated by priests, just as the school 
took over some of the institutional responsibilities that had formerly belonged to the 
Church.  Some communities came to rely on teachers and other laymen to take the 
social role of priests and perform necessary ceremonies (marriages, baptisms, burials: 
Weber 1976:342).  Both priests and teachers were local notables whose positions 
were based on having esoteric knowledge, both played key roles in communal affairs, 
both were usually sons of artisans or farmers promoted by schooling, and both 
represented official culture (especially through using the French language, 362). 
Originally, laïcité laws were primarily aimed at teachers, not students 
(Hargreaves 1997:197), despite its interpretation throughout the headscarf debates in 
France, which have focused almost exclusively on students. The 1989 ruling of 
Conseil d’Etat, the Bayrou circular in 1994 and the 2004 law were all supposed to 
reinforce, clarify, and redefine the fundamental principle of laïcité that was so 
important to the French Republic.  These laws reinforce the French view that 
freedoms are obtained through the state, rather than from some outside source 
(Bowen 2007:15).  The view that rights and freedoms are secured in order to protect 
the individual from the state is more connected with multiculturalism.   
Although it is often thought of as a positive concept, multiculturalism is 
looked down upon in France because it is perceived to reinforce particularist and 
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divisive identities that threaten the unified French national identity.  Fears about 
multiculturalism and regionalism (which are closely tied together) became prevalent 
in France during 1980s for many reasons, such as the weakening of republican 
integration and rise of regionalism that accompanied Mitterrand’s policies of 
decentralization (Amselle 2003:117).  Multicultural policies, which are often seen as 
following the “Anglo-Saxon model,” are said to lead to increasing communalism 
(communautarisme) and ghettoization in society (Hargreaves 1997:183) or to 
tribalism (Beriss 1990:8).  The retention of separate ethnic identities is considered to 
be premodern.  In modern society occupation, class and national political identities 
have replaced fragmentary, regional and ethnic ones emphasized by multiculturalism 
(Vichniac 1991:41).  In a multicultural society, individuals cannot leave cultural and 
religious identities behind (as they should, according to the social contract) because 
multiculturalism holds that these identities are assigned rather than chosen.  This sort 
of automatic cultural membership goes against the republican values that the French 
state holds so dear (Laborde 2001:721).  In effect, France recognizes national identity 
because it is a social fact, and denies cultural difference even though it is a social fact 
(728).   
Several factors have made France’s ethnic and religious minorities more 
visible in the public eye since the 1980s.  In the following pages, I will focus on only 
three of these factors: the beur movement, riots in the banlieues, and the presence of 
headscarf-wearing girls in French public schools. 
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A beur is a second or third generation descendant of North African migrants.  
The word comes from the verlan (French slang) word for “Arab.”  In the 1980s many 
beurs became involved in anti-racist and anti-discrimination organization, such as 
SOS-Racisme.  Members of this generation have been exposed to two contradictory 
socializations as children (Noiriel 1996:162).  Although this can sometimes lead to 
feelings of self-hatred and a desperate willingness to adapt to the host country (168), 
it can also lead beurs to declare their hybrid identity, not as an in-between or liminal 
category but as a stable racial category of identity in and of itself (Silverstein 
2005:374).  Beur religious identities are also different from popular perceptions of 
intense Islamic religiosity.  In 1992, two-thirds of Algerians in France were either not 
religious at all (30%) or not practicing (38%: Hargreaves 1995:125).   
Although cases of urban violence have had more media presence (especially 
in the international media) in recent years, there have been cases of mass urban 
violence in French suburbs, or banlieues, since the 1980s.  These riots nearly always 
follow the same pattern.  An unarmed youth is involved in a minor incident, or is 
suspected of involvement.  Following a pursuit, he is shot by the police; this shooting 
sparks off the riot (Hargreaves 1995:73).  Yvan Gastaut calls this the “Algerian 
Syndrome” and traces the occurrence of several small incidents that led to large riots.  
Between 1971 and 1977 at least 70 Algerians killed in such riots, which occurred 
primarily in southern France (2000:268-88, cited in Lucassen 2005:185).  Despite 
Gastaut’s label, we should remember that these riots are not a North African youth 
problem (Noiriel 1996:178).  They are the result of particular historical, economic 
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and cultural contexts in France.  They also reflect the conflict and cultural 
reproduction that is happening at more individual levels.  After all, the politics of 
cultural reproduction serve as emotional fuel for more violent politics at the larger 
levels of community, neighborhood and territory (Appadurai 1990:18).     
  The cultural reproduction of dress also serves as fuel for larger conflicts.  
Although they are visually separate and distinct, most of girls who wear headscarves, 
and who are thought of as the most culturally distant and “other,” speak French most 
of the time and think of themselves as French.  They see themselves as integral, 
contributing members of French society; only their headscarves, a minor, surface 
level difference, mark them as distinct.  Even this mark of “distinction” may actually 
be a mark of membership, albeit to a religious or ethnic community rather than a 
national one (Bowen 2007:72-81; Keaton 2006:147-8).  
The increasing visibility and media presence of beurs, urban violence in the 
banlieues and headscarves are only three of the many ways that France has become a 
more ethnically diverse society in the past twenty-five years.  The mounting empirical 
evidence of the presence of many ethnicities, religions and identities in France have 
come into more and more tension with the French nation’s imagining of itself as a 
unified, cohesive whole.  Why does France continue to refuse a more multicultural, 
pluralistic self-imagination?   
Terence Turner’s insights on multiculturalism may help us solve this paradox.  
In “Anthropology and Multiculturalism,” Turner distinguishes between two types of 
multiculturalism.  While “[c]ritical multiculturalism seeks to use cultural diversity as 
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a basis for challenging, revising, and relativizing basic notions and principles 
common to dominant and minority cultures alike, so as to construct a more vital, 
open, and democratic common culture”, difference multiculturalism is that of 
“cultural nationalists and fetishists of difference” (1993:413-4, emphasis removed).  
Difference multiculturalism reduces culture to “a tag for ethnic identity and license 
for political and intellectual separatism” (414).   
The presence and activism of the beurs, the wearing of headscarves, and even 
urban violence are all evidence of critical multiculturalism that has been wrongfully 
interpreted as evidence of difference multiculturalism.  As such, the state thinks that 
each of these needs to be monitored, regulated, controlled and discouraged in order to 
ensure its own security.  Although the political activism of the beurs is tolerated by 
the state, headscarves and urban violence have both come under strict governmental 
regulation, and even repression, in recent years.  While headscarves and riots would 
seem to be evidence of difference multiculturalism at first glance, a closer look 
reveals that these forms of multicultural activity share the goals of critical 
multiculturalism, despite the fact that they may use either concretely or symbolically 
violent means.  The Muslim girls who wear headscarves are not fighting for the right 
to establish and attend Muslim religious schools (as they would if they were focusing 
on difference multiculturalism).  They wish to be part of the existing French public 
school system while maintaining an important part of their identity.  In the 1980s, 
beurs were fighting the racism and discrimination that prevented them from 
successfully integrating into French society; they did not fight to establish their own 
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separate subculture.  Even riots can be seen as critical multiculturalism, as the rioters 
fight (at least at the beginning of riots) in protest of their unequal treatment by the 
French police and legal system.  Ultimately, most North African migrants and French 
Muslims do not want to be separate from France and French national identity.  They 
would like to redefine what France is, and what it means to be French, to fit the more 
diverse realities of France as it is today.  As Farid Laroussi says,   
Dealer, imam, soccer player, budding writer encaged in the blues of the 
banlieues or buffoon on the encrypted television channel, the circus can begin.  
We have passed from being intruders to being almost invited guests.  But what 
happened to the others?  To the majority, who had pushed their studies far, 
who worked somehow or other, who said: my country is France?  Like a 
photograph where we had to pose for an eternity, they tell us: don’t breathe.  
Doesn’t the legitimacy of this hexagonal conscience reside in the candid truth 
that it was up to us to integrate ourselves?  There’s the greatly feared word.  
Latin tells us that to integrate is to make complete.  We are therefore half-
citizens, the republic’s rubbish.  Everywhere we represent the repressed 
feelings of a backwards colonialism…Integration, for us French of North 
African origin, is the theater of betrayal (Le Monde 11 December 2003). 
 
Essentialist definitions (in this case, of “French” and “North African” or 
“Arab”) do not allow for the recognition of multiple ancestral heritages and life 
experiences (Levi and Dean 2003:16).  This perceived threat of difference 
multiculturalism provoked an even stronger reactive emphasis on French national 
unity, history and identity since the 1980s.  According to Pierre Nora, the blossoming 
of heritage festivals during the 1980s were partial responses to the threats to common 
participation and cultural model of patrimony caused by the 1970s economic crises.  
During this time, the eclipse of the rural and artisanal world of “true France” was 
traumatic for many (1984-6, cited in Terrio 1998:21).   
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In its attempts to revitalize and rebuild French national unity and identity, the 
extreme right sought to make small independent producers, and their preindustrial 
values, the bases of national and cultural regeneration (22).  In addition to its return to 
“traditional” French values and identity, the Front National and its leader, Jean-Marie 
Le Pen, transformed the “immigrant problem” into a national issue.  Although the 
Front National has been around since the mid 1970s, it was not until the Front 
National won control of the city council and the deputy mayorship in Dreux in 1983 
that it became a significant political force.  The Front National maintains a staunchly 
anti-immigrant platform and engages in ethnic scapegoating of North Africans 
(Hargreaves 1995:182-3).  As they began to take votes from the central right, the 
center-right parties themselves began to espouse more anti-immigrant platforms 
themselves in an attempt to regain these votes (185).   
As Appadurai rightly points out, majorities can be mobilized to think that they 
are in danger of becoming minorities, and to fear that minorities might become the 
majority (2006:83).  On a grander scale, what Stolcke refers to as “cultural 
fundamentalism” (1995:5) is seen in the way that France is turning inward in the face 
of global challenges.  In this context France is the minority and the United States the 
majority in the global world.   
In the face of these challenges many states turn to violence.  After all, 
violence creates certainty (2006:6).  This is connected to Appadurai’s notion of 
predatory identities.  These identities require the extinction of other, neighboring 
social categories which are defined as threats.  Predatory identities usually come from 
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pairs of identities with histories of close contact, mixture and mutual stereotyping.  
One of these identities becomes predatory by mobilizing the understanding of itself as 
a threatened majority (Appadurai 2006:51).  This is further complicated by the 
“imperialist nostalgia” (Rosaldo 1989:68-87, quoted in Levi and Dean 2003:27) that 
the French hold for their lost colonial empire.   
France’s longstanding colonial presence in North Africa, as well as the long 
history of North African migrants to France, has created such a situation of predatory 
French identity that must limit the threatening presence of North African and Muslim 
identities.  This tension of French and North African identities became even more 
complicated with large-scale immigration to France throughout the 20th century.  This 
dichotomy of identities was reformed in the process.  While the tense pair of 
identities had been French-North African in the past, it was now reformulated as 
French-immigrant or French-foreigner.  Both immigrants and “foreigners” have 
played an integral role in the invention of the French nation.  The “crisis” resulting 
from their entry into the nation-state’s sovereign space is essential to the nation-state 
because identity is only articulated in relation to the differences that it inscribes 
(Feldman 2005:214).   “Indeed, invoking such differences [colonial differences that 
represent the ‘other’ as inferior and radically different] are, we might say, 
commonplaces in the politics of discrimination, and hence also in the many 
contemporary struggles for identity” (Chatterjee 1993:33).  There is much anxiety 
about the relationship between the nation-state and the “foreign” nations that it 
contains (Levi and Dean 2003:12).  This oppositional and coterminous creation of the 
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French nation and the non-French foreigner becomes clear if we examine the history 
of the presence and regulation of these “foreigners” in France. 
One way of limiting the power and influence of just such a threatening 
minority was to forbid the wearing of headscarves in French public school systems in 
2004.  The varying levels of danger associated with headscarves can be seen in the 
different ways that the ban on religious symbols has been enforced in different 
schools.  This flexibility of interpretation stems from the wording of the law itself:  
Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenue 
par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse 
est interdit.   
 
In public primary and secondary schools, wearing signs or clothes by which 
pupils clearly display a religious affiliation is forbidden (Stasi 2003:68, 
translation from Bowen 2007:136).   
 
The criterion is based on a sort of “semantic transparency of the object” 
because it forbids immediately recognizable signs of religious affiliation.  
Determining just what is “immediately recognizable” is subjective (140).   
Since the passing of the law, school officials have interpreted and enforced it 
differently.  Some officials take the context of the neighborhood and the school’s 
student body into account.  For example, in Trappes officials decided that a discreet 
veil was not ostentatious because it blended in with the clothing styles worn by other 
students.  Here, officials focused more on the effect of headscarves, as opposed to the 
objects themselves (141).  As Ghislaine Hudson, the principal of a lycée (high school) 
in Melun, said,  
We have to decide whether or not a scarf has religious meaning.  First we see 
if the girl wears it every day or just sometimes.  If she always wears it and it 
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might be religious, then I might talk with her; teachers are instructed not do so 
lest they differ in what they say.  I ask the pupil whether the scarf is a 
religious sign or not.  Some say it does have religious meaning and then they 
have to remove it, but we allow her to substitute a bandana (142).   
 
Schools differed on whether they allowed discreet head covering or not, how 
they conducted the dialogue process and their interpretations of the intended scope of 
the law.  Schools could pass internal rules to make the directive more specific, or take 
the school’s social context into account (as we saw above).  Overall there were no 
real problems with enforcing the ban during the new school year.  Oddly enough, the 
clearest challenges to the law came not from Muslim girls wearing headscarves, but 
from young male Sikhs.6  Throughout France, 47 students were expelled for wearing 
religious symbols that school year (Bowen 2007:150).  550 cases were resolved 
through dialogue, and 96 students began alternative learning in order to pursue their 
education while wearing a headscarf (151).   
 
                                                 
1 At least, it is interpreted as such.  In reality veiling or covering is a much more complex phenomenon.  
For example, some women wear head coverings out of habit or as part of customary cultural practice.  
In this example, the headscarf would be seen as a marker of ethnic identity, which is almost as harmful 
to the building and continuation of a French national identity as marking religious affiliation, as we 
will see. 
2 Rousseau (writing in 1762) did not distinguish between culte and religion in the same way as 
Sevaistre did in 2003. 
3 Of course, ethnic, regional and religious practices and beliefs are often inextricably intertwined. 
4 Michele Tribalat’s 1995 Faire France is the only exception to this statistical blindness. Most social 
scientists working in the issues of immigration in France cite Tribalat’s numbers.  On the other hand, 
statistics presented in popular media (such as newspapers, television, and radio) are typically based on 
simple estimations.     
5 Positivism is the philosophy first defined by Auguste Comte which contends that human thought 
progresses through three stages: the theological, the metaphysical and the positivist.  The positivist 
stage of human thought relies on empirical sensations as the basis for knowledge and thought, as 
opposed to the operation to divine forces (theological) or abstract supernatural processes (the 
metaphysical). 
6 From 1995-2003, Sikhs had an arrangement with the Interior Ministry that allowed them to wear 
turbans while having their identity photographs taken.  At the beginning of the 2004-5 school year, 
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some schools chose to allow Sikh students to wear a “discreet turban,” much in the same way that 
some schools chose to allow Muslim girls to wear light scarves (couvre-chefs).  However, some 
schools enforced internal bans on headcoverings for Sikh students as well.  One lycée expelled three 
Sikh students for wearing turbans to school in fall 2004.  This was the “clearest case of infringement” 
of the ban on religious symbols (Bowen 2007:150). 
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Chapter 3: Timing and the Internal and External Context of the Headscarf 
Debates 
Why did the headscarf become an issue in France in 1989?  How can we 
explain the reoccurrence of “headscarf affairs” in 1994, and again in 2003?  We have 
already established that headscarves are fundamentally connected to issues of 
immigration, laïcité and the increasingly multicultural composition of French society.  
The occurrence and reoccurrence of “headscarf affairs” is undoubtedly connected to 
the complexities and ambiguities of these wider issues.   
If headscarves and immigration really are connected in France, we should 
begin looking to the issue of immigration for possible explanations for the timing of 
headscarf debates.  Patrick Weil contends that there is a cycle of immigration crises 
that stem from the settlement of migrant communities whose presence was thought to 
be merely temporary.  At first, this settlement leads to xenophobia, but then the crisis 
is stabilized and the cycle begins again.  Weil uses similarities between immigration 
in the 1930s and that of 1975-1990 as an example of two analogous points in this 
cycle (1991a:82-3).   
Although Weil’s explanation highlights a pattern within immigration itself, I 
believe that there are more issues than that of immigration at work in the occurrence 
and reoccurrence of the headscarf affairs in 1989, 1994 and 2003.  The particular 
confluence of perceived threats and challenges from within French society, its unique 
history of immigration, and the perceived external threats or challenges to France 
provided by globalization, the development of the European Union, and transnational 
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Islam significantly contributed to the timing of the headscarf affairs in France.  A 
long-standing history of North African immigration to France and French colonial 
occupation of North Africa, tensions from an increasingly interconnected and 
globalized world, economic downturns, and shifting identities that controvert easy 
categorization combine to create the social and cultural context in which the French 
headscarf debates have arisen.  As Lisa Lowe says, immigration is the screen or site 
on which the nation projects anxieties regarding internal and external threats to the 
coherence of the national body (1996:18, quoted in Silverstein 2005:366).     
 I begin this chapter by addressing the French discourses of insertion and 
integration.  Here, I use discourse in Foucault’s sense of the term as encompassing 
both power and knowledge (1978:100), where relations of power are immanent in all 
relationships (rather than lying outside of them: 94).  This is followed by a discussion 
of republican citizenship in France with special attention given to the role of 
“foreigners” in the creation and maintenance of the French national community.  Next 
I give a brief overview of the history of North African immigration to France.  Then I 
detail how France dealt with this influx of newcomers throughout the 20th century.  I 
describe the living conditions and challenges of life in the suburbs, or banlieues, of 
France.  Finally, I address how external organizations and processes of globalization 
and membership in the European Union have contributed to the creation of anxieties 
about French national identity. 
Until the 1980s France followed a policy of insertion to deal with its migrant 
population.  In essence, the policy of insertion aims to control and regulate the 
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presence of migrants and their cultural differences.  On the other hand, integration 
aims to lessen, and eventually erase, those differences altogether.  Before the 1980s, 
immigration and republican citizenship were relatively unconnected issues (Favell 
1998:46).  Insertion, unlike integration, implies that implantation in French society 
does not happen on an individual basis.  The community has representatives who 
report to the authorities, and who try to keep the group’s uniqueness intact.  
Resources and rights are allocated to migrants through special means, such as positive 
discrimination or a device that guarantees equality of rights (Weil 1991a:92).  
Insertion was not a unified policy, but a collection of smaller, more focused practices 
that avoided the big political questions that would later become so important.  
Privileged sites for insertion include local self-help associations, cultural groups and 
representatives of migrants.  Overall it was set up to avoid social disturbance (Favell 
1998:47).   
An important concept came out of this policy of insertion that would be often 
misunderstood later on: seuil de tolérance (threshold of tolerance).  This originally 
referred to an economic limit to the number of migrants that France could reasonably 
insert into society (48).  Since then, it has often been used to mean that France has a 
cultural limit to the number of “foreigners” that it can absorb.  The political victory of 
the right led integration to become the dominant discourse in public debates, with 
peculiarly strong focus on immigration (150-1).  Integration is associated with the 
individual absorption of people into French society, one by one, through participation 
in French social institutions (Weil 1991a:92, citing Kepel 1988:281-2).  Furthermore, 
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“each one accepts being a part of the whole and makes the commitment to respect the 
integrity of the whole” (ibid., citing Costa-Lascoux 1989:8-12, see also Weil 
1991b:245).  The political right is responsible for the linkage of immigration, 
integration and republican citizenship and nation-building.  While the state deploys 
rites and symbols of integration to forge a common sense of identity (Foster 
1991:239), integration is an active process that involves the activity of the individual 
agent (Favell 1998:71).  This mirror’s Ernest Renan’s view that membership in a 
nation involves will (Renan 1882).  This will is based on the shared experiences of 
historical knowledge.  “The assumption, in the discourse of nationalism, is that we 
have a common identity, we were the same, we have been the same, and therefore we 
are and/or we shall be the same” (Hannoum, forthcoming).   
 Insertion and integration both draw upon the myth of republican citizenship, 
which is in turn based largely on the myth of the French Republic.  Many current 
imaginings of the French nation refer back to the Third Republic (1871-1914), which 
in turn referred back to the 1789 Revolution.  According to Eric Hobsbawm, the 
Third Republic helped to solidify the invention of the French nation in three critical 
ways.  First, it developed the secular equivalents of the church and the priesthood in 
primary education.  It also created public ceremonies, including Bastille Day, the 
most important French national holiday, which dates from 1880.  This holiday yearly 
reasserts the principles and memory of the 1789 French Revolution.  Finally, the 
Third Republic mass produced public monuments.  The depiction of Marianne, the 
personified French Republic, was especially prevalent.  Overall, the Third Republic 
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avoided references to history itself, as this brought back the ghosts of monarchy and 
church power.  Unlike the United States, France did not develop a “cult of Founding 
Fathers” and preferred to shape its self-imagining around general symbols (1983:271-
2).   
The myth of republican citizenship crucially depends on this imagined French 
nation and on the general symbols created and utilized by the Third Republic.  This 
myth of republican citizenship has two basic claims.  First, it claims that the 
uniqueness of France’s political and cultural heritage (republican and based on 
citizenship) is the determining factor in today’s immigration policy (Favell 1998:44).  
Secondly it requires immigration as an issue to be framed in terms of a unique French 
heritage.  If we consider that the culturally fundamentalist option of the extreme right 
and the Front National are on one side, and the acceptance of American or British-
style multiculturalism or plurality are on the other side, republican citizenship is the 
middle ground choice (57-8).  Republican citizenship deals fundamentally with 
distinctions between foreigners, citizens, and immigrants.  I will now turn my 
attention to these three categorizations.   
 The rules and concepts underlying French citizenship and nationality 
developed alongside, and partially out of, the clarification and elaboration of the 
concept of the “foreigner” (étranger).  From the time of the French Revolution until 
the 19th century it was social classes, not foreigners, who were considered 
problematic (Noiriel 1996:47).  In the late 19th century, legal distinctions between 
French and foreigners were solidified.  The 1898 law specifying that foreign families 
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could not claim compensation from work accidents unless they lived in France was 
particularly important in this regard (80).  During the 1880s and 1890s 
anthropomorphic data (called bertillonage) were included on identity papers in order 
to identify and regulate foreigners (69).  Identity cards that distinguished between 
whites, non-whites and tourists began to be used in 1915 and continued under the 
Vichy regime during World War II (61-2).  This documentation and certification is an 
important part of the invention of the nation.  The bureaucratization of identities 
creates those categories, constructs borders and conflicts, and lays the path for the 
assimilation of heterogeneous elements (Foster 1991:245).   
While foreigners remain firmly outside the bounds of the nation-state, 
immigrants are both inside its bounds and outside of them at the same time.  The 
problematic nature of this category is seen not only in the regulation of citizenship 
and nationality, but also in the history of immigration itself in France.  In the 
following pages I will address this history, with a particular emphasis on immigration 
from Algeria (which was the second largest foreign nationality in France in 1990, 
after the Portuguese: Schor 1996:236).   
 The migratory currents of Algerian workers to France originated in the 
seizures of land and property, as well as the population displacements, following the 
1871 insurrection1 against French colonial rule (Gillette and Sayad 1984:39).  
Although some Kabyles emigrated from Algeria at this time, the numbers remained 
quite small until World War I (40).  This is partly because Algerians were technically 
French subjects (sujets) rather than French citizens at this time (MacMaster 1997:51).  
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As such, their movements were relatively restricted, and they were only allowed to 
travel to the metropole with relative freedom in 1914.   
Most of these early migrants were Berber men from the mountains of Kabylia.  
This area had developed a system of seasonal labor under Ottoman rule (Lucassen 
2005:174-5).  Berbers were also seen as a preternaturally mobile race, which 
contributed to their being targeted for labor recruitment after World War I (Silverstein 
2005:369).  Benjamin Stora estimates that there were 4-5,000 Kabyle Berbers in 
France in 1912.  Many of these workers returned to Algeria at the outbreak of World 
War I (Gillette and Sayad 1984:48).  However, many were later recruited back to 
France to make up for the need for laborers.  In September 1916 the French 
government decreed a requisition of Algerian workers.  According to Gillette and 
Sayad, the aim of this decree was to prevent resistance from French Algerians 
(colons) rather than to force Algerian workers to come to France (49).  This number 
rose drastically during World War I, when there were about 132,000 (not including 
the 173,000 present in the army: Stora 1992, cited in Lucassen 2005:173).  Out of a 
total of 116,000 workers from 1914-1918, 78,000 Algerians and 54,000 Moroccans 
and Tunisians were requisitioned.  Overall, 240,000 Algerians were mobilized or 
drafted, and two-thirds of these were soldiers who served mostly in France.  This 
constituted more than one-third of the men from ages 20-40 (Gillette and Sayad 
1984:50).  According to Laroui, Algeria sent 173,000 soldiers, 25,000 of whom 
where killed.  Tunisia sent 56,000, of whom 12,000 were killed.  Moroccan soldiers 
helped to defend Paris and landed at Bordeaux in 1916 (1977:351-2).   
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During the late 1910s and 1920s, reconstruction and labor shortages led to 
even larger numbers of Algerian workers coming to France.  These workers were 
from many parts of Algeria, not just Kabylia (Gillette and Sayad 1984:51).  Although 
many of these workers returned to Algeria as a result of the 1929 Depression, 
migration was reestablished at its former levels by 1936.  This was partly the result of 
collective recruitments in the villages conducted by Frenchified native officers who 
pressed the workers into the company’s holding camps (camp d’hébergement:54, 
citing Michel 1956:53).  Labor recruitments continued throughout the 1940s (57-8).   
Most of these early migrants never meant to settle in France.  This partly 
explains their slow integration (175).  North Africans were mostly recruited for 
dangerous and low-wage jobs.  They generally preferred industrial to agricultural 
labor (Mauco 1932:170; MacMaster 1997:67).   
As Partha Chatterjee points out,  
It is possible to give many instances of how the rule of colonial 
difference…can be employed in situations that are not, in the strict terms of 
political history, colonial.  These instances come up not only in relations 
between countries or nations, but even within populations that the modern 
institutions of power presume to have normalized into a body of citizens 
endowed with equal and nonarbitrary rights (1993:33).   
 
These migrants were perceived as less civilized and racially inferior.  They 
were often thought to be violent, prone to criminal behaviors.  For migrant workers in 
France, this image is a false one that refers to primitive, oppressive and superstitious 
“Islamic” practices and Arab racial origins, despite the fact that many migrants are of 
Amazigh (Berber) origins.  This demonization of Muslims as dangerous and 
benighted mirrors the situation of the Moro of the southern Philippines, who were 
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characterized in such a way by the Spanish colonialists, the Commonwealth and the 
independent government of the Philippines (Anderson 2003:170-1).   
The economic depression of the 1930s led to increasing xenophobia in France.  
This “peaceful invasion” of North African migrants led to an anti-immigrant 
backlash.  Migrants were seen to threaten the metropole’s cultural life and the 
economic future of France (Silverstein 2005:370).  Immigration was stopped and 
some migrants already present in France were forced to return to their home 
countries.  By the end of the 1930s immigration policies seemed incoherent and 
ineffective.  A single, overarching immigration policy was proposed out of a concern 
for coordination and coherence (Weil 1991a:85).   
After the Vichy regime during World War II, an ethnically controlled 
immigration policy was seen as unethical, although there were de facto preferences of 
certain white, European nationalities for immigration to France.  However, this policy 
of choosing favored races and cultures of origin was undermined because migrants 
from these (primarily European) cultures went elsewhere for work.  In addition, the 
process of choosing migrants of particular origins took too long for a developing 
economy, and Algerians could circulate freely in France in the meantime2 (Weil 
1991a:87-8).   
The period from 1945-1974 is often referred to as the Thirty Glorious Years 
(Trente Glorieuses) of immigration in France (Tapinos 1992:421).  The 1950s 
brought a gradual shift from unsettled to settled North African migrants.  Wealth 
inequalities and rising land prices had polarized Kabyle villages, making resettlement 
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in France more appealing (MacMaster 1997:110-2).  These migrants brought their 
families, and more of them came from the Arab parts of Algeria (Stora 1992:94, cited 
in Lucassen 2005:178; see also Gillette and Sayad 1984:61-2).  According to the 1954 
census, there were 212,000 Algerians in France.  By 1962, the number had risen to 
350,000 (Gillette and Sayad 1984:60).   
Under colonialism, the colony was “a domain in which a state can act in 
particular ways, especially by using coercion to obtain land for metropolitan settlers 
and labor for their enterprises…racial distinctions serve to channel different peoples 
into specific economic roles” (Stoler and Cooper 1997:18-9).  These relations of 
economic domination continue; the former colonies provide primary commodities to 
the former metropole (19).  Fanon compares the situation of colonized peoples to 
enslavement (1963:190).  Furthermore, some authoritative intellectuals, such as  
Robert de Souza and Maréchal Lyautey, thought that the colonies offered the best 
model for experimentation and planning to be used in the metropole itself (Rabinow 
1989:273,289, cited in Silverstein 2004:85).   
The Algerian War (1954-1962) complicated the situation of North African 
migrants in France.  During the war the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale), who 
fought for Algeria’s independence from France, encouraged Algerians in France to 
maintain an anti-integration stance.  The French state responded with repressive 
retaliation (Lucassen 2005:183).  On October 17, 1961 the French police crushed a 
peaceful demonstration of tens of thousands of people marching in protest of a curfew 
on Algerian Muslims in France.  In some places they beat and arrested protesters, 
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while at the Neuilly Bridge  they opened fire on the demonstrators (Cole 2003:24), 
killing as many as 200 Algerians in the process (MacMaster 1997: 200).   
The steepest rise in immigration began after the Algerian War and continued 
until 1973, when immigration to France was stopped by the Algerian government due 
to violence against Algerians in France (Lucassen 2005:179).  After the war ended 
80,000 collaborators (called harkis) left Algeria and moved to live in camps in 
southern France.  In addition to the harkis, about a million pieds noirs (colonists of 
European descent in Algeria) left Algeria (180).   
In the 1960s and 1970s, France became a more multiethnic and multicultural 
society (Safran 1985:42).  Partially in response to this multiplication of ethnicities 
France strengthened its immigration controls in the mid 1970s.  From that time until 
the present, immigration would remain a constant issue.  In a period of economic 
downturns and scarce resources, minorities are seen as competition with “native” 
French (français de souche) for jobs (Hargreaves 1995:180-1).  During the late 1970s 
the government became more repressive because of perceived problems with illegal 
immigration, crime in the banlieues (both by and against North African migrants and 
French Muslims), and racism.  This changed in the early 1980s, when the Mitterrand 
government took a more relaxed stance towards immigration and citizenship (Safran 
1985:54).    
 The “problems” of the banlieues begin with their formation and construction 
itself.  As Paul Silverstein points out, colonial worries about enclaves (both rural and 
urban) that are incompatible with the modern nation-state combined with a desire to 
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create new forms of sociality for migrant workers in France (2004:82).  In the early 
20th century (and even in some places today), many of the early migrants in France 
were housed near their places of employment in hostels.  However, once the patterns 
of immigration shifted to more permanent settlement hostels could no longer fulfill 
migrants’ housing needs.  The government provided nothing to help out this situation, 
so migrants themselves set up bidonvilles, or shantytowns, on vacant land outside of 
big cities or in the worst parts of inner cities.  According to the 1966 census, there 
were 119 bidonvilles around Paris, housing 46,827 people, mostly of North African 
descent (Ogden 1979:32, cited in Lucassen 2005:187; see also Silverstein 2004:91).  
Although several slum clearance programs were launched in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, these proved ineffective.   
In 1964, the Debré laws led to the building of council housing for France’s 
burgeoning migrant population (Lucassen 187).  In the mid 1970s money was 
allocated to provide public housing for migrant families from a 1% share of the 
payroll by companies.  This money helped to fund the creation of HLMs (Habitation 
à Loyer Modérée: Rent-controlled Housing), ZUPs (Zones à Urbaniser en Priorité: 
Priority Urbanization Zones) and ZACs ( Zones d’Aménagement Concerté: 
Combined Planning Zones) in the banlieues (Hargreaves 1995:70-1).  In time, 
banlieu would become the byword for social exclusion (72), partly due to the media’s 
obsession with the banlieues that began in the mid 1990s which characterized them as 
decaying hotbeds of unemployment, violence and Islamic fundamentalism 
(Silverstein 2004:107, 109).       
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 The construction of these large housing schemes ended in 1973 (Damon 
2001:159).  The 1980s were marked by concerns for job placement, preventive 
measures against breaks in law and order, urban upgrades, and decentralization (160).  
Paris became more and more anxious about its suburbs, which had an estimated 
population of 10.6 million.  These banlieues were said to be shifting from being 
communist-dominated “red” suburbs into ethnically and racially different “black” 
enclaves which were a haven for newly-arrived migrants (Miller 1991:49).  
Beginning in the early 1970s, foreigners were assigned housing in HLM areas 
governed primarily by communists (Lucassen 2005:188).   Whenever one of the few 
remaining middle class families left the banlieues, they were replaced by newly-
arrived migrant families (Althabe 1985:15).  However, we should not that not all 
banlieues are the same.  In fact, different banlieues take on different characters 
according to their inhabitants’ self-defined placement in socioeconomic hierarchies 
(68).   
 The early 1990s were marked by efforts to revitalize and renew urban areas 
inhabited primarily by migrant workers and their families.  The 1990 Besson Law 
established the right to housing, and a 1991 law directed wealthy local authority areas 
to give money to poorer areas (Damon 2001:160:1).  In 1993 a “Marshall Plan” for 
banlieues set forth the five main objectives of employment, preventing delinquency, 
education, and improving housing and public services.  In 1994 advantages were 
offered to civil servants who were willing to work in sensitive areas (161).   
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Changes in the structure of local government in 1995 were followed by the 
development and reorganization of ZUSs (Zones Urbaines Sensibles: Sensitive Urban 
Zones), including ZRUs (Zones de Redynamisation Urbaine: Urban Revitalization 
Zones) and ZFUs (Zones Franches Urbaines: Urban Free Zones:161-2).  In 1996 
France began the Urban Relaunch Pact, which was based on positive geographical 
discrimination, despite the fact that this could be seen to support the recognition of 
particularities and the consequent dangers of communalism.  The new government in 
1997 led to a new emphasis on security, law and order.  A government report on 
urban regeneration and development called for actions beyond all existing policies, 
including a new approach to priority areas and a shifting of urban policy from the 
local to the regional level (162-3).   
Although housing estates and the banlieues are often referred to as “ghettos” 
by the media and in the popular imagination this is a misnomer.  No French city has 
ever experienced the concentration of poverty, social ostracism and racial segregation 
present in many cities in the United States (Damon 2001:163).  In fact, the “ethnic 
mix” of the housing estates in the banlieues was carefully controlled in order to 
prevent such ghettoization. 
The foreigner will be, we think, drowned out by the French population, 
making him adapt, that is, conform to the majority customs: in any case he 
will disappear as a cultural stranger.  On the other hand, if they [foreigners] 
are too numerous, without a doubt because the power relations are different, 
foreigners may interpret French behaviors as impediments or attacks.  The 
choice appears logical: between quotas and ghettos, one clearly chooses 
quotas (Weil 1991b:254).   
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This ethnic balance of quotas was difficult to maintain due to the departure of 
many middle-class French in search of better housing and the unwillingness to 
measure ethnic statistics after the 1970s (256).  Despite their common depiction as 
ethnic ghettos, the housing projects remain diverse, although their inhabitants still 
observe boundaries (Bowen 2006:31).  Deprived areas are defined statistically and 
there is no such thing as a typical example (Damon 2001:164).   
The banlieues are actually very diverse, lively and dynamic places inhabited 
by inventive and resourceful people, despite their bad public image (166).  However, 
there are problems with physical safety and they are sometimes spaces where identity 
and belonging are fervently defended.  While urban renewal has made some progress, 
it has not fixed all of the problems (167).   
Recent efforts at urban renewal call for more resident participation.  There are 
some fears that policies of positive discrimination have merely confirmed the 
dynamics of inequality that they were intended to hold in check (169).  In order to 
have positive discrimination, the government must first define a particular area as 
having negative characteristics.  This risks further “ghettoization” and leaves some 
locals unable to participate.  This can radicalize opposition and create tensions (170).   
For North African migrants and French Muslims, this contentious history of 
immigration and geographical segregation has been compounded by other forms of 
exclusion.  Before the mid 1970s migrants held badly paid, low-skill jobs (Hargreaves 
1995:40).  Migrants have served as a reserve labor army, especially since the 
increases in unemployment since the late 1980s (42-3).  Migrant workers have been 
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segmented into the service sector the economy (49).  Increasing numbers of North 
African migrants and French Muslims are part of the secondary labor market, making 
them more vulnerable to job insecurity (50).  Migrants and French Muslims who are 
searching for jobs face problems of the lack of qualifications, language barriers, and 
discrimination (especially against Africans: 56).  This is evidenced in the large gap 
between unemployment rates among Europeans and non-Europeans (61).  In 1992 the 
unemployment rate for young men of Algerian origin was twice that for young men 
of Spanish or Portuguese origin in France (Tribalat 1995, cited in Lucassen 
2005:191).       
 Problems of unemployment are related to those of educational inequalities 
faced by North African migrants and French Muslims.  Positive discrimination has 
been used in education (through the creation of  ZEPs [Zones d’Éducation 
prioritaires: Priority Education Zones] and REPs [Réseaux Prioritaires: Priority 
Networks]) to identify these inequalities and aim extra assistance at these areas 
(Keaton 2006:129).  Educational success is largely predicted by the parents’ 
educational and professional status.  For students of North African origin, this record 
is especially bad.  These students tend to leave school earlier, and they lack important 
qualifications.  However, ethnic differences become insignificant if we control for 
economic difference (Hargreaves 1995:64).     
Poor living conditions are also an important factor in the lives of migrant 
workers and French Muslims.  Many of these housing estates have not been repaired 
or adequately maintained since they were built in the 1960s and 1970s.  These 
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housing units were also built according to the norm of nuclear families.  Many people 
who live in these estates are parts of large extended families who are trying to “make 
do” with cramped living quarters.  There are ethnic concentrations caused by housing 
discrimination and chain migration (where one migrant brings members from his 
family or home community to the same area in the host country), and native French 
(français de souche, or white French) have largely abandoned these neighborhoods to 
migrant workers and French Muslims (Hargreaves 1995:69).  Efforts at urban renewal 
have largely failed because they do not work with communities to identify what they 
need or want (Keaton 2006:82-3).   
 Social exclusion is the combined effect of this economic, educational and 
spatial exclusion and marginalization.  As Favell points out, changes in geographic 
and urban financial structure have led to worse social conditions (1998:189).  This 
social exclusion and marginalization is often spoken of in terms of “ghettoization,” 
which is seen as the antithesis of good integration into French society (Hargreaves 
1995:39).   
These various exclusions have had profound effects on North African 
migrants and French Muslims at the more personal level.  Abdelmalek Sayad 
contends that work gives birth to the immigrant.  He exists through work; when there 
is none he dies or is negated (1991).  In the host country, the immigrant looses his or 
her points of reference and has to contend with a sense of uprootedness, loss of status 
and symbolic capital, and feelings of anonymity (Noiriel 1996:120, 127).  While 
some respond to this by renouncing or abandoning practices so as not to feel 
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stigmatized, others withdraw into the community or play with their appearance 
(Noiriel 1996:128).  As we have seen, this fits with the increasingly visible ways that 
multiethnic communities in France are making their presence known through beur 
activism, urban violence, and the wearing of headscarves.   
As Appadurai points out, new kinds of migration create new levels of tension 
between identities of origin, identities of residence and identities of aspiration for 
many migrants in the world labor market (2006:37).  For marginalized peoples of all 
kinds globalization is a “source of worry about inclusion, jobs, and deeper 
marginalization” (35).  Despite current media attention, “[t]he coming crisis of the 
nation-state may lie not in the dark cellularities of terror but in the utopian 
cellularities of these other new transnational organizational forms” (137).  Two of 
these new organizational forms that are challenging the bounds of the French nation-
state are the European Union and the global economy.   
 In the face of increasing power and importance of the European Union, France 
is becoming more introspective and nationalist (Favell 1998:172).  The negative 
philosophy that lies underneath national policy becomes most visible when it is used 
to justify anti-European Union initiatives (244).  France is especially opposed to the 
multiculturalist norms espoused by the European Union (170).  In additions, the 
norms and laws of the European Union grant residence rights to migrants which clash 
with national laws (165).  Despite this tension, the breakdown of the nation-state’s 
power on immigration and integration is unlikely (250).    
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 France also feels great anxiety and fear about American cultural domination in 
the form of globalization or neoliberal economic policies.  Susan George summarizes 
neoliberalism as “the idea that the market should be allowed to make major social and 
political decisions; the idea that the State should voluntarily reduce its role in the 
economy, or that corporations should be given total freedom, that trade unions should 
be curbed and citizens given much less rather than more social protection” 
(1999:online).  These policies would understandably conflict with France’s tradition 
of a strong state presence in many parts of life.  Bourdieu holds that neoliberal 
policies lead to “the destruction of all the collective institutions capable of 
counteracting the effects of the infernal machine, primarily those of the state” 
(1998b:online).  Neoliberal policies also lead to increasing inequalities, which are 
seen at the popular level as the product of global capitalism (and the United States) 
left unchecked (Appadurai 2006:23, Bourdieu 1998b).     
In 1983 Benedict Anderson pointed out that the last wave of nationalism was 
in response to global capitalism (127).  Some of the changes in global capitalism 
since the 1970s include a shift to economic redistribution on a global level, the 
decline in the manufacturing industry, the growth of the service sector, women 
working more often, and more casualization of the secondary labor market 
(Hargreaves 1995:51).   Modernization may in fact permanently change the labor 
market.  Unions are weakened as a source of class identity, so there is a need for new 
solidarities or return to old ethnic solidarities and sources of identity (Safran 
1985:58).   
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If a global cultural system truly is emerging, it is full of ironies and resistances 
(Appadurai 1990:3).  Global culture is not homogenous; it uses instruments of 
homogeneity that have been absorbed into local economies and then repatriated as the 
heterogeneous dialogue of national sovereignty, free enterprise and fundamentalism.  
The state’s role here is a delicate balance between self-reliance and fruitful 
interconnections.  This tension exacerbates the internal politics of majoritarianism 
and homogenization, leading to more debates on heritage (17).  These debates on 
heritage often take on a violent tone.   
In speaking of violence, we should remember that it is not just the product of 
antagonistic identities.  Violence is but one of the ways that the illusion of fixed and 
charged identities are created.  Fundamentalism (of whatever kind) provides a way to 
produce certainty that was previously not required (Appadurai 2006:7).  This situation 
is even more potentially dangerous because of the new slippage between majority and 
minority identities and powers (10).  The elimination of difference is the real goal of 
new predatory narcissisms, although in reality this is impossible (11).   
This concern to eliminate difference and reassert the nation is seen in the new 
violence that rages against market forces, is anti-American, and fights for the return 
of the patriot/martyr/sacrifice (12).  States can name their own internal dissidents, 
activists and minorities, since terrorists—the new global enemy—are part of a global 
network (20).  As Pierre Bourdieu points out,  
“If it is true that one form of universalism is no more than a nationalism which 
invokes the universal (human rights, etc.) in order to impose itself, then it 
becomes less easy to write off all fundamentalist reaction against it as 
reactionary…terrorist violence, through the irrationalism of the despair which 
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is almost always at its root, refers back to the inert violence of the powers 
which invoke reason” (1998a:19-20).   
 
Globalization has produced new global forms of solidarity that exist on the 
same level as the state (Appadurai 2006:24).  This coexistence at the same level helps 
to explain some the tensions between the national and the global as categories.  The 
complementarity and difference between the cellular and vertebrate systems gives a 
structural way to examine the crisis of the nation-state in an era of globalization and 
forces us to see that the forms of global terrorism are only instances of deep and 
broad transformation in the morphology of global economy and politics (29).     
                                                 
1 Worsening economic and living conditions for peasants in French Algeria led two-thirds of the 
population to take part in this revolt against French rule.  The revolt continued for seven months before 
it collapsed (Laroui 1977:304-5). 
2 From 1947 until its independence in 1962, Algerians were allowed to move freely back and forth 
between metropolitan France and the colony (Gillette and Sayad 1984:?).  Thus, what is typically 
referred to as “Algerian immigration to France” is technically more akin to internal migration within 
France itself.  The term “immigration” does apply to both Morocco and Tunisia, however, as these 
were both officially French protectorates, not French colonies.   
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Anthropologists and sociologists have long been concerned with the process 
of the emergence of large-scale societies that may include many different cultures 
within them.  The recent interest in globalization continues this trend, as globalization 
can be seen as the emergence of a global society.  As different societies around the 
world become more and more interconnected, the importance of explaining and 
negotiating differences of many kinds becomes paramount.    
For small-scale societies culture (or the common consciousness) is the basis of 
social solidarity.  It both brings people together and distinguishes them from other 
groups with other cultures.  Durkheim describes this as the state of mechanical 
solidarity (1933, cited in Hanson 2007:4).  However, as the division of labor itself 
became more elaborate after the beginning of agriculture, the basis of social solidarity 
also changed.  People were held together by their differences rather than their 
similarities.  This new kind of solidarity is referred to as organic solidarity (1933:131, 
cited in Hanson 2007:5).   
However, not all kinds of difference are positive and complementary.  There 
may also be either contradictory or compartmental kinds of difference in society.  
Contradictory difference is a situation where different parts of society compete with 
each other in an antagonistic manner (Hanson 2007:7).  If people feel threatened by 
extant differences, this often leads to conflicts of various kinds, and thus to 
contradictory difference (11).  On the other hand, compartmental difference refers to 
a situation where different parts of society act as distinct elements that work in 
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isolation from each other (7).  If differences are seen as irrelevant, or if they are used 
as tools of exclusion, coexistence in isolation, or compartmental difference, occurs 
(11).  If the differences that shape society are either compartmental or contradictory 
(rather than complementary), then society “retain[s] the same cultural closure of 
small, homogenous societies with mechanical solidarity” (8).   
According to Durkheim, a complex division of labor does not always lead to 
social cohesion and organic solidarity.  Differences can hold people together 
successfully only when those differences are perceived to mesh together 
harmoniously (Hanson 2007:7).  Durkheim thought that any sort of detrimental 
differences would eventually work themselves out (1933:381, cited in Hanson 
2007:9).  Today, however, few social theorists share such an optimistic view of 
society and its problems. For example, according to Hanson contradictory and 
compartmental differences are more likely to develop in large scale societies than 
complementary ones.  In part, this is due to cultural differences, which Hanson refers 
to as “the trouble with culture” (2007:9).   Culture becomes a marker of identity, 
which in turn is used as a political weapon in struggles between different groups (10).  
As Appadurai puts it, ethnic identity serves as a flashpoint for uncertainty and 
insecurity between and within states (2006:103-104).     
In this chapter, I will explore Hanson’s distinction between contradictory and 
compartmental difference.  Using Arjun Appadurai’s notions about the use of 
physical violence to create certainty in an uncertain world and Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of symbolic violence to shed light on the relationship between contradictory 
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and compartmental difference, I clarify how the headscarf affairs were instances of 
contradictory difference that arose out of a context of compartmental differences.  In 
turn, the headscarf debates served to define, mark and reinforce the boundaries of 
different parts of French society in a continuing situation of compartmental 
difference.   
Cultural differences, as well as religious, racial and economic ones, are often 
used to explain the “problems” or justify the treatment of North African migrants and 
French Muslims.  This, in turn, leads to both contradictory and compartmental 
differences.  From the issues of beur demonstrations, urban violence and the 
headscarf debates that I addressed in chapter 2, the most obvious example of 
contradictory difference would be the cases of urban violence and riots in the 
banlieues.  Here, cultural differences are seen as threatening by both competing 
parties: the so-called “real French” people feel threatened by the North Africans’ 
cultural differences, especially by Islam.  The inhabitants of the banlieues in turn feel 
threatened by police violence and discrimination, economic stagnation, and religious 
intolerance.   
When we return to Hanson’s distinction, we find that the urban violence and 
riots can be connected to, or even described as, compartmental difference as well.  As 
I showed in chapter 3, the banlieues are nothing if not parts of French society and 
French cities that have developed and now operate in isolation from each other and 
from mainstream French society (and French cities) as a whole.  The culture of the 
banlieues—including both their perceived North African and Muslim makeup, as well 
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as the actual makeup of these areas—are used as a tool of social exclusion as well, as 
I showed in chapter 3.   
The headscarf affairs themselves also seem to be examples of both of these 
kinds of difference at the same time.  On the one hand, they constitute a contradictory 
difference because of the intense conflicts and arguments between Muslims and the 
French state which these affairs have sparked in 1989, 1993-4, and 2003-4.  
Mainstream French culture felt threatened by the presence of scarf-wearing girls in 
one of its most fundamental institutions, while French Muslims felt that their freedom 
of religious belief and practice was threatened by the intolerance of the French state 
and culture.  However, they also seem to be examples of compartmental difference, as 
the presence of scarf-wearing girls was partially explained by the Muslim 
“immigrants’” refusal to adopt French culture and values, such as laïcité.  The 
geographical, cultural and religious isolation, or communalism (communautarisme) of 
the banlieues was also used to explain the behavior of scarf-wearing girls in public 
schools in France.   
Given Hanson’s careful and clear distinction between these two kinds of 
difference, how can they seemingly coexist in the cases of urban violence and the 
headscarf debates in France?  In each of these cases, I think that the existence of 
compartmental difference provided the context for contradictory difference to arise.  
In turn, the boundaries and borders of the different parts in compartmental difference 
are defined, reinforced and marked by instances of contradictory difference (see 
Feldman 1991 for an in-depth look at this process in Northern Ireland).   
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Enforcing the boundaries between majorities and minorities would constitute 
a compartmental difference, as it closes off different parts of society from each other.  
Minorities blur the boundaries between us and them, here and there, in and out, 
healthy and unhealthy, loyal and disloyal, needed and unwelcome.  They also serve as 
the linchpin for uncertainties about the national self (Appadurai 2006:44-5).   
As a group, migrants and French Muslims often feel uprooted and are seen as 
dangerous because of their perceived lack of definite allegiances and ties to France 
and French society.  The most culturally “distant” of these migrants and their 
descendants are thought to be the most dangerous because they are the most difficult 
to categorize in French society’s terms.   
This danger is contained through inclusion into or exclusion from the social 
order.  In terms of migrants in France, inclusion means cultural integration or 
assimilation.  On the other hand, migrants or French Muslims who have not been 
integrated or recognized as different and unique are systematically excluded from 
society and are denied equal standing and rights to many of the benefits of French 
society.   The creation of this excluded status, this otherness, also helps to reinforce 
and mark French national and cultural identity more clearly.     
In France debates and speeches about headscarves and immigration serve as 
public rituals that link the present to both the French Revolution and the Third 
Republic and solidifies French national identity.  These rituals also focus the public’s 
perceptions on particular issues, such as headscarves, riots in the banlieues, or the 
need to redefine key concepts such as laïcité.  These particular issues often become 
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the foci of contradictory difference.  Just as public rituals choose particular issues out 
of an array of possibilities surrounding culturally excluded minorities in France, 
instances of contradictory difference arise out of contexts of compartmental 
difference. 
Contradictory difference is marked by conflict, and often by violence of one 
form or another.  Anxieties about minorities, national uncertainty and incompleteness 
lead to attempts to reestablish completeness and certainty through the use of violence.  
Since national economies have been virtually lost to globalization, this violence 
(along with the desire for purity, authenticity, and defined borders) is found mainly in 
the cultural field (Appadurai 2006:22-3).  Violence by the insecure state is often 
perpetrated against minorities, as they are reminders of and metaphors for the betrayal 
of the nation (Appadurai 2006:43).  Violence against minorities is intended to 
reinforce the nationalist project.  Nation-states tend to fight hardest against people 
and movements who threaten the existence of popular nationalism, the nation-state’s 
internationally accepted claims to sovereignty, and its ability to build coalitions from 
local communities (Anderson 2003:181).   
Although Arjun Appadurai focuses on the power to eliminate minorities 
through violence, Bourdieu’s concept of the power to dominate those minorities 
through the creation and use of symbols, while still maintaining the existence of these 
minorities, is even more important.  Because it is invisible, and thus hard to identify 
and to fight against, symbolic violence is even more effective than physical violence 
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(2001:35).  Symbolic violence is another way that contradictory difference and 
conflict is expressed. 
Symbolic violence is the maintenance of domination of one group over 
another through the use of symbolic systems (Bourdieu 1991:167).  The dominant 
group aims to impose itself on others through creating its own system of symbolic 
production that places their own capital at the top of the hierarchy (168).  The capital 
itself is merely the objectified form of the symbolic value, which is defined by its 
location at the top of the hierarchy (238).  Struggles over these objects produce 
euphemized forms of the economic and political struggles between different groups 
(169).  
Thus the struggles and debates over the headscarf in French schools is a 
euphemized form of larger struggles between different groups of people in French 
society.  Although they are conducted through the medium of symbols, these 
struggles are ultimately over the power to define, to classify and to legitimize these 
classifications.  The power to classify is the power to “make people see and believe, 
to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the 
divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups” (221).  
As we have seen, defining and classifying groups of people is fundamentally 
connected to compartmental difference.  In this way, in conflicts that are seemingly 
waged over contradictory difference the real struggle is often more connected to 
compartmental difference.  In a system of domination, a sense of one’s place implies 
tacit acceptance of one’s position, a sense of limits, and a sense of distances to be 
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marked, maintained, respected and expected of others (Bourdieu 1991:235).  These 
limits and distances can be marked and maintained through visible means, such as 
headscarves.  Similarly, the boundaries of different parts in a system of 
compartmental difference are marked and maintained through instances of 
contradictory difference. 
The headscarf serves as a useful tool and medium to highlight, express, mask 
or erase differences.  While North African migrants and French Muslims call 
attention to their separate values and cultural identity (or identities) through the 
headscarf, the French state uses the issue of the scarf to direct attention away from the 
underlying, less-visible and less-solvable problems of economic and racial 
inequalities.  North African migrants and French Muslims have expropriated the 
symbol of the headscarf from the colonial system of domination and used it to express 
a North African migrant and French Muslim point of view within the current system 
of domination.  French society has used the headscarf as both the target and the 
medium of symbolic and structural violence against France’s minorities in order to 
create and solidify French national identity.   
More specifically, the preexistence of compartmental difference in France’s 
Muslim population and the banlieues served as the context that created and shaped 
the contradictory difference expressed by the several cases of urban violence and the 
headscarf debates.  While the ambiguous, widespread and slippery nature of 
compartmental differences themselves make them more insidious and hard to defeat 
(as Hanson points out in the case of poverty; 2007:24-5), contradictory difference is 
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easier define, and thus easier to resolve.  This is particularly true when the 
contradictory difference revolves around a symbol, as was the case with the headscarf 
debates.  This could explain why the furor surrounding the headscarf died down in 
France after the 2004 law was passed, while problems of urban violence continued.   
As Bourdieu states, “to exist socially means also to be perceived, and 
perceived as distinct” (1991:224).  French society must acknowledge that North 
African migrant workers and French Muslims are distinct communities with unique 
identities in order for them to have any social role at all, even if it is an antagonistic 
one.  As Levi and Dean point out, the nation-state needs to  
strike a delicate balance between, on the one hand, homogenizing discourses 
that explain away differences—discourses that are explicit in nationalism, 
integrationist policies, and orthodox social movements—and, on the other 
hand, an emphasis on heterogeneity, which acknowledges pluralism but in the 
worst case could be misinterpreted as a postcolonial incarnation of the 
imperialist’s military strategy of divide and conquer.  Achieving such a 
balance involves developing policies that preserve the liberty of individuals in 
ways that do not eradicate the autonomy of groups, social networks, or 
communities (2003:12, emphasis added).   
 
If I am right about the interrelationship between contradictory and 
compartmental differences, it would appear that the only way to truly put a stop to 
contradictory differences is to focus on fixing the situation of compartmental 
difference itself.  In essence, this could be accomplished through finding a balance 
between the protection of individual and group rights, as Levi and Dean point out 
above.  Encouraging the opening up of culture would also help to alleviate the 
problems of both contadictory and compartmental difference, as these detrimental 
differences lead society to retain the closed culture of mechanical solidarity (Hanson 
 74
2007:8).  Finding a better balance between individuals and collectivities and 
cultivating more pluriethnic or multicultural views of society would, in the end, 
encourage the existence of Durkheim’s complementary differences and thus organic 
solidarity itself.   
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
Banlieues—French suburbs.  Banlieues often house a high concentration of ethnic 
minorities, and are stigmatized as poor, violent and dangerous. 
 
Bertillonage—created by Alphonse Bertillon in the late 19th century, bertillonage was 
the method of using bodily measurements in order to identify people.   
 
Beur—French slang (verlan) term for Arab. 
 
Bidonvilles—shantytowns around major French urban centers which housed 
immigrants and their families.  These were destroyed in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, when they were replaced by large housing estates in the 
banlieues. 
 
Chador—large black garment worn by Muslim women, primarily in Iran. 
 
Communautarisme—Although it can be directly translated as communalism, this 
concept entails a return to particular, segmentary identities.  It is also 
somewhat akin to tribalism. 
 
Couvre-chef—a small headscarf of lightweight fabric.  This is often proposed as an 
alternative to the foulard that is more acceptable to schools. 
 
Culte—organized religion; the outward expression of private religious belief 
(religion).  See chapter 2 for details. 
 
Fatwa—religious opinion issued by an Islamic scholar. 
 
FCPE—Federation of Parents of Students Councils. 
 
FEN—Federation of National Education. 
 
FIS—Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front).  A popular Islamic political 
party in Algeria.  After FIS gained success in the first round of parliamentary 
elections in January 1992, the elections were cancelled and the party was 
banned in March of that year.  These events sparked the Algerian Civil War 
(1992-98). 
 
FLN—Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front).  This organization 
fought for Algeria’s independence from France in the Algerian War (1954-
62). 
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Foulard—literally scarf, this term usually refers to the style of Muslim dress that is 
commonly called the hijab or headscarf. 
 
FNMF—National Federation of French Muslims. 
 
Français de souche—of French stock.  This denotes people who are French not only 
by birth and by culture, but also by blood. 
 
Front National—The extreme right French nationalist political party headed by Jean 
Marie Le Pen. 
 
GIA—Groupe Islamique Armée (Armed Islamic Group).  This Islamist organization 
was created after the 1992 cancellation of elections in Algeria after FIS’s first 
electoral victory.  This cancellation radicalized many FIS supporters, some of 
whom then created the GIA. 
 
Harkis—those who collaborated with the French during the Algerian War (1954-62). 
 
Hijab—this refers to the headscarf worn as part of appropriate Muslim dress since the 
late 1970s.   
 
HLM—Habitation à Loyer Modérée.  Rent Controlled Housing. 
 
Jus sanguinis—through the law of blood.  This refers to citizenship laws which base 
the acquisition of citizenship on having parents of a particular nationality. 
Jus soli—through the law of territory.  This refers to citizenship laws which base the 
acquisition of citizenship on being born in a particular territory. 
 
Laïcité—the French version of secularism, this refers to the state’s neutrality in 
regards to religious beliefs (religion).   
 
Mission civilisatrice—civilizing mission.  Although this term is often used in the 
context of France’s colonial empire and its perceived mission to civilize 
various native peoples around the world, it may also be used in the context of 
France’s internal consolidation at the end of the 19th century. 
 
MRAP—Movement Against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples. 
 
Pieds noirs—literally meaning “black feet,” this term refers to European Algerians 
(i.e. the descendants of European colonists in Algeria). 
 
Religion—private religious belief.  See chapter 2 for details. 
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Seuil de tolérance—the threshold of tolerance.  Although this phrase originally 
referred to France’s limited economic capacity to take on immigrants, it has 
come to be used to express France’s limited cultural capacity to integrate 
immigrants and their descendants. 
 
SNES—National Union of Second Degree Education. 
 
SNI-PEGC—National Union of Teacher-Professors of General Education of Collèges 
(equivalent to junior high schools in the United States). 
 
L’Unapel—Union of Parents of Private School Students. 
 
UOIF—Union of Islamic Organizations of France. 
 
Verlan—French slang that tends to reverse the order of syllables in words.  For 
example, verlan itself is a reversed slang version of the word “l’envers”—the 
reverse. 
 
ZAC—Zones d’Aménagement Concerté.  Combined Planning Zones. 
 
ZFU—Zones Franches Urbaines.  Urban Free Zones. 
 
ZRU—Zones de Redynamisation Urbaine.  Urban Revitalization Zones. 
 
ZUP—Zones à Urbaniser en Priorité.  Priority Urbanization Zones. 
 
ZUS—Zones Urbaines Sensibles.  Sensitive Urban Zones. 
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